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Relationships between the United States and its worldwide network of allies has, 
since the inception of NATO, greatly revolved around the United States’ ability and 
desire to permanently station troops oversees. Since 1941, the United States has entered 
into these basing agreements for a variety of strategic and sometimes political reasons. 
From NATO’s inception, and as the cornerstone of its defensive structure, the United 
States has combined the idea of sending troops to different regions of the world with a 
global basing strategy founded on the concepts of overlapping protection and 
deployability. At times, to gain access to areas of strategic interest, the United States has 
offered aid and economic assistance along with a military presence. In other cases, 
positively affecting the political climate of the country was the stated goal of troop 
presence. This thesis will examine the effects of basing in Greece and Spain in order to 
uncover lessons learned which might be applied to the new US global basing plan and 
current troop positioning activities in Kyrgyzstan. In both cases the United States worked 
with openly dictatorial governments for the purposes of basing and did not foster the long 
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Relationships between the United States and its worldwide network of allies has, 
since the inception of NATO, greatly revolved around the United States’ ability and 
desire to permanently station troops oversees. Since 1941, the United States has entered 
into these basing agreements for a variety of strategic and sometimes political reasons. 
From NATO’s inception, and as the cornerstone of its defensive structure, the United 
States has combined the idea of sending troops to different regions of the world with a 
global basing strategy founded on the concepts of overlapping protection and 
deployability. At times, to gain access to areas of strategic interest, the United States has 
offered aid and economic assistance along with a military presence. In other cases, 
positively affecting the political climate of the country was the stated goal of troop 
presence. In the case of Greece, the United States entered into a combined role of 
economic benefactor and political ally, as Truman began his plan to “support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure.”1 
Coupled with the idea of eradicating Greek communists were open statements from 
Truman to the Greek government that in return for economic aid, Greece would need to 
heighten its level of democracy and change its oligarchic image2. Twenty years later, 
with the arrival of the junta, this openly stated goal of a democratic future was virtually 
forgotten. However, military aid continued despite diminishing freedom. Spain’s Franco 
regime on the other hand, uninterested in opening democratic doors, gained both military 
and economic assistance by leveraging its strategic location and to receive a de facto 
membership in the Western alliance3. In one case, the United States seemingly lost track 
of its original goal; in the other, the goal of future democracy was never stated. In both 
cases, however, the United States worked with openly dictatorial governments for the 
purposes of basing. This thesis will examine the effects of basing in these authoritarian 
regions for strategic reasons and uncover whether or not there are lessons learned which 
should be applied to new US global basing plan and our current activities in Kyrgyzstan.  
                                                 
1 Pogue, p 167 
2 Duke 310 
3 Duke 293  
2 
The United States is currently undergoing a major restructuring that will lead to 
troops being placed in formerly communist counties with differing levels of democracy. 
This new plan (dubbed the “lily pad” approach to basing by the General James Jones, 
head of the European Command) will change how the United States views and deploys 
its oversees basing. As Jones stated in 2003, “All 26 Army and Air Force installations in 
Germany, except for the Air Force as Ramstein, might be closed. In effect this could 
mean transferring 5 army brigades, some 25,000 troops, to the east.”4  
While the idea of restructuring America’s military has been around for many 
years, it was not until August of 2001, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
ordered a complete evaluation of basing in Germany and Korea, saying that both were 
remnants of the cold war, that the plan was formally put into place. With the impetus of 
the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Defense initiated a complete reexamination of the 
locations to which troops will be sent and the way in which they will deploy in the future. 
Reasons for the realignment are clear: change in mission, increased flexibility, and long-
term support for the War on Terror necessitate a new way of doing business5. The new 
deployment arrangement calls for troops to leave large garrisons in Germany and man 
smaller garrisons around the world on what will become 6-month rotations. Families 
would not accompany the troops on deployments and would stay in the United States6, 
thus saving money on infrastructure and cutting the rather large cost of moving families 
around that globe every 2 to 3 years. Many of the locations being considered would have 
troops rotating through on a full-time bases. These locations might include places like 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Other locations could serve as smaller, 
minimally staffed, jump off points, closer to hot spots. These locations might be in 
countries like Kyrgyzstan, Romania, or the Philippines7.  
Thus, it is important to examine how entering into basing arrangements with 
countries with such differing levels of democracy (in some cases authoritarianism) will 
                                                 
4 Lawrence J. Korb. “ The Pentagon’s Eastern Obsession." The New York Times (30 JUL 03): p A.17 
5Schrader, Esther. “United States Expedites Reshuffling of Europe Troops.” Los Angeles Times (01 
MAY 03) 
6 Ibid. 
7 Jaffe, Greg. “Arc of Instability: The Pentagon Prepares to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners.” The 
Wall Street Journal (27 MAY 03) p A. 1 
3 
affect the long-term relationships between these countries and the United States. As more 
US decisions are made regarding where and how to deploy troops, this question will 
grow in significance as the US continues to opening express desires of developing 
democracy while working with newly democratic, ex-communist, countries possessing 
varying levels of freedom. 
If increased authoritarianism is associated with US basing presence in the cases of 
Greece and Spain, and if the anti-American sentiment that stems from the association 
leads to an eventual decay in the relationship, should a predetermined level of democracy 
be a requirement for future basing decisions? With regard to Greece and Spain, many 
questions about basing must first be answered to properly apply any lessons learned to 
current decisions.  
First, what were the stated political goals for basing in each location? In the case 
of Greece, what happened to the country internally when the declared purpose of the 
United States changed? Second, was basing that support these regimes justified, when 
compared with the strategic goals it attempted to meet? When considering the long-term 
effects, was it a solid decision?  
Some might argue that in both cases the decisions were more reactions to strategic 
needs than part of any political plan. If this were the case, could the same mistake be 
happening again?  
After covering the articles of NATO’s charter and how US views towards basing 
evolved, this paper will look at the levels of democracy existent in Greece and Spain 
before the US became involved. Additionally, this paper will look at the global situation 
and outside influences which existed when the US entered into basing agreements with 
the two countries.  All aspects of the decisions and their outcomes will be evaluated to 
reach conclusions on the important diplomatic questions involved in the process.  In the 
cases of both Greece and Spain the United States continues to deal with repercussions of 
basing decisions made many years ago, the underlying question is whether or not there 
are lessons learned which should be applied to the approach the United States is taking in 




























II. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND U.S. ENTRANCE INTO 
GLOBAL BASING 
Western Europe’s evolution from its post WWII destruction to economic 
prosperity was a difficult task for the countries involved. Yet amazingly, a mere six years 
after the Yalta conference, the democratic countries of Europe, along with the United 
States, were solidifying the world’s first peacetime alliance8 based on self help and 
mutual aid instead of shared aggression and protection from an enemy.  This evolution 
and how it led to basing Spain and Greece is key to the overall story.  The primary 
question involved with this transition is: How did the shared goals and individual 
economic needs of the allies drive articles II, III and X of the charter, and how did they, 
along with key events, influence the Truman administration (originally uninterested in 
permanent European stationing) to make large commitments to the continent that 
ultimately led to basing in Greece and Spain? Additionally, how did the inception of 
NATO, coming at a time when the Korean War threatened world peace9, not only 
solidify the importance of the articles but encourage a western military buildup and help 
develop NATO’s command and control structure.  
This chapter will discuss the buildup with regard to NATO’s charter and show 
how the process of creating the alliance was effected, in terms of burden shifting or 
sharing, by the emergence of a Soviet-led bloc and the Korean War. Burden shifting is 
the process in which countries, set on limiting their own contribution, encourage more 
from others, but not so much as to destroy the overall alliance10.  This process of pushing 
and pulling amongst member countries strengthened the coalition while helping to 
encourage participation from member states11.  The chapter will also examine how this 
process drove strategic basing decisions. By focusing on major basing trends before and 
after NATO’s creation, this chapter will show how the alliance itself drove the need for 
                                                 
8. NATO Office of Information and Press. NATO Handbook. Brussels, Belgium: 2001. p.421 
9 Ibid. p 87.  
10 Thies, Wallace J. Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO. Armonk,  NY.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2003 p. 7.  
11 Ibid.  
6 
allied military basing in Europe and created a situation where the inclusion of US forces 
was vital to its success.  
A. POST WORLD WAR II EUROPE: ECONOMIC CONCERNS AND 
ARTICLE II  
In 1945, entire stretches of Western Europe lay in ruin. In Germany, as well as in 
most of the continent, railways, bridges and communication lines were totally 
destroyed12. More than a million and a half Germans had been killed in action; an 
additional two million were missing and another half million were prisoners who would 
not likely return13. In France, more than a million and a half buildings were destroyed or 
seriously damaged. So extensive was the damage that experts viewing the destruction 
estimated that it would take the two countries 20 years to rebuild14. Industrial production, 
key to any recovery, had slowed to less than half of what it had been in 1938; in Germany 
it was close to nonexistent15. Foremost in the minds of many was quickly establishing an 
environment where the mistakes of World War I and the treaty of Versailles would not be 
repeated. As said by Sloan, a noted NATO historian, “As the end of WWII neared, US 
president Franklin D. Roosevelt was particularly sensitive to the fact that president 
Wilson’s failure at the end of WWI to engage the United States in the League of Nations 
had led to failure in Europe and the rise of Adolph Hitler”16. He wanted distant control; 
he wanted to be active in post WWII Europe but did not want to commit troops. 
Unfortunately, world events and economic conditions would ensure more US 
engagement than he originally wanted. By the time the war ended, neither the United 
States congress nor the next president, Harry S. Truman, showed any interest at all in 
becoming permanently involved in the basing of forces in Europe17. Demonstrating the 
feelings of the president and US public opinion alike (to bring the boys home quickly and 
effectively), of the 3.5 million US Army soldiers deployed in Europe at the end of World 
                                                 
12 Wilkinson, James., Hughes, Stuart H., Contemporary Europe, A History, 10th ed. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ.: 2004. p 368 
13 Ibid. p. 369  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.   
16 Sloan, Stanley R. NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community. Lanhan, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p. 13 
7 
War II, 3.1 had returned home as of 194618. As stated at the Yalta conference, 
Roosevelt’s goal was to have the entire US contingent home within two years of the 
war’s end19. The troops that did remain on foreign soil were increasingly oriented toward 
force projection and stability operations rather than toward defense of European 
territory20.  
As Roosevelt wished, troops not only returned home but left the military in what 
was the biggest military downsizing operation in American history. Similar to the end of 
the World War I, American leaders took full advantage of the relative calm after the war 
to conserve funds for other purposes. The total force dropped from 11.8 million soldiers 
in uniform in 1945 to just over 1.5 million in 195021. The hardest hit was the Army, 
which fell from 8.1 million in 1945 to only 632,000 in 195022. Building or maintaining 
military forces in Europe was clearly the furthest thing from most leaders’ minds. What 
was important to western leaders, however, was the future economic success of Europe.  
Bevin, the British Secretary of Defense instrumental in NATO’s creation, wanted 
a unified Europe to have the same power as the United States. In his mind, Europe would 
eventually need to be equal in power to the United States. A situation like this, he 
reasoned, would enable the Europeans and the Americans to profitably and productively 
make the most of all available resources23. He also new that the fate of Europe was going 
to be decided very quickly and that action was needed soon24. He soon made it known 
that the power of the United States was needed to build the confidence necessary to take 
Europe through its economic transition. In Bevin’s line of thinking, democracy, 
                                                 
17 Thies, Wallace J. Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO. Armonk,  NY.: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2003. p 23.  
18 Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York.: Oxford 
University Press, 1989. p xxi.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Sloan, Stanley R. NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community. Lanhan, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p 7.  
21 Department Of Defense. Selected Manpower Statistics, Fiscal year 2002. US DOD, Washington 
Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information, Operation and Reports. 2002.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Thies, Wallace J. Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO. Armonk, NY.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2003. p 22 
24 Ibid. p 22 
8 
prosperity, and security were all inseparably linked25, and he was not alone with regard to 
the important relationship between economic stability and peace. Thomas, author of The 
Promise of Alliance, said, “Early, conceptions about providing for the security of Europe 
rested on assumptions about the centrality of economic recovery, which would restore 
confidence and generate prosperity”26. How the United States and other allies chose to 
deal with this question had a dramatically positive influence on Europe’s economic future 
and an enormous impact on perceptions among western allies toward permanent basing in 
Europe. 
Foreshadowing some of the thoughts behind article II of the charter, George C. 
Marshall outlined the importance of an economic aid package to Europe during a speech 
to Harvard in 1947 by saying, “It is logical that the United Sates should do whatever it is 
able to do to assist in the return on normal economic health to the world, without which 
there can be no political stability and assumed peace”27. Fearing exactly what Bevin had 
warned, Truman, Marshall and their staffs feared that without massive US economic 
help, the continent would sink into permanent hopelessness that would in turn lead to 
political extremism and other problems28. The ultimate goal of the Marshall plan was the 
hope that economic strength would lead to a Europe that could one day handle its own 
military defense29. Completely opposite to the Treaty of Versailles, which required the 
Germans to pay billions of dollars to the victors30, the Marshal plan was an offer of 
billions to rebuild the destroyed countries of Europe, including that of the loser, Western 
Germany. France and Great Britain saw this as a sign of long-term concern from 
Washington toward Europe’s long-term success and openly greeted the plan31. Giving 
over 3 billion dollars to England and 2.5 billion to France, the plan spread the wealth to 
                                                 
25 Ibid.  
26 Thomas, Ian Q.R. The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination. Boulder, Colo.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 19.  
27 Ibid. p 10.  
28 Wilkinson, James., Hughes, Stuart H., Contemporary Europe, A History, 10th ed. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ.: 2004 p 415.  
29 Thomas, Ian Q.R. The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination. Boulder, Colo.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 10 
30 Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York, NY.: Simon and Schuster, 1994. p. 257.  
31 Sloan, Stanley R. NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community. Lanhan, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p 14.  
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every country that was willing to accept it32. The plan was a solid example of the United 
States beginning what was to be a long period of cooperation between the allies. The 
plan, which was actually known as the economic cooperation act of 194833, had a 
phenomenally positive impact. Not only did the expanded amount of aid lead to increased 
output, but overall production of goods and services rose by 25% during the first 4 years 
of its inception34, and by 1950, the production levels in France and Italy stood well above 
what they had been in 193835.  
As successful as it was, the Marshal plan itself had nothing to do with increasing 
America’s desire for oversees basing. The entire concept behind the plan was in fact to 
strengthen the continent so that it could one day defend itself with very little US 
assistance. What was to open the door for American long-term positioning of troops 
oversees was a combination of the these desires for long-term stability and a need to help 
protect the continent from the possibility of Germany ever returning to its once powerful 
and hegemonic ways. It was also a way to protect the world from the perceived and 
growing communist aggression in the region, and this would eventually lead to US 
intervention in both Greece and Spain. 
Shortly after NATO’s inception, these pre-existing concerns combined with the 
Korean War, to provide an impetus for a substantial US force in Europe36. This was the 
key to substantial growth in US basing.  The North Korean invasion into South Korean 
across the 38th parallel proved the views of Dean Acheson and others who were already 
expounding the importance of being able to counter offensive communist moves around 
the globe, particularly in Europe37. While combat was raging on the Korean peninsula, 
the United States set out to prove its commitment to prevent aggressive Soviet actions in 
                                                 
32 Wilkinson, James., Hughes, Stuart H., Contemporary Europe, A History, 10th ed. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ.: 2004 p 415. p 422.  
33 Thomas, Ian Q.R. The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination. Boulder, Colo.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 10.  
34 Wilkinson, James., Hughes, Stuart H., Contemporary Europe, A History, 10th ed. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ.: 2004 p 415. p 422. 
35 Ibid. p 422  
36 Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York.:  Oxford 
University Press, 1989 p 7.  
37 Ibid.  
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Europe by increasing the size of its existing contingent and planning for larger bases in 
the future. Actions in Korean necessitated US counteraction.  
In the eyes of the allies, the only thing that could change or alter the way the 
European economy had been recovering was the threat of communist growth38. This 
perception combined with a US desire to create an economically sound Europe and 
opened the door to oversees basing and articles II, III and X of NATO’s charter. How the 
change in perception came about is clear, but the series of decisions and events that led to 
it were not necessarily assured at the end of WWII. They were, in fact, a combination of 
many conflicting allied goals and unforeseen events.  
Britain, after 6 years of war, and the liquidation of their financial markets in 
former colonies, was in a horrible state39. The steady drain they had experienced on their 
remaining funds for food had left them financially destitute40. This situation led Bevin, 
one of the planners behind the Western Union concept and key player in the Brussels 
Treaty41, to inform the United States that Britain was no longer capable of maintaining its 
long-term aid to Greece and Turkey42, both of whom were involved in civil wars against 
communist aggression and required allied support.  
Although it did not have to take on the burden, the United States, fearing what 
appeared to be a spread of communism and a threat to Europe’s economic stability, 
decided to render aid. This action, coming before NATO’s actual charter, set a strong 
example of what would later be considered “burden sharing” among allies and further 
solidified the relationship between the two continents.  When the United States picked up 
the torch for freedom and began to send aid, it clearly accepted what was formerly a 
foreign responsibility and allocated the needed resources. The action of one country 
taking up responsibility, or desiring another country to share more of the burden, was 
                                                 
38 Thomas, Ian Q.R. The Promise of Alliance, NATO and The Political Imagination. Boulder, Colo.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. p 19.  
39 Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: Statesman. New York, NY.: Penguin Books, 1987. p 161. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Sloan, Stanley R. NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community. Lanhan, 
 Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. p 11.  
42 Thies, Wallace J. Friendly Rivals, Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO. Armonk, NY.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2003. p 22.  
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what would later become the heart of NATO and ultimately, the reason for US troops 
being based in Europe.  
President Truman, concerned with communist aggression in the region and 
confident that the burden formerly held by Britain was an important one, pledged 400 
million in Greece to “support free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities”43. 
This was the earliest commitment of the United States toward long-term stability through 
anything other than economic aid, and something that would solidify the relationship 
between the countries involved. The desire for an economically stable Europe combined 
with a fear of communism to lead President Truman to prescribe the containment concept 
as the new guiding principle behind US foreign policy44. Coming as a radical shift to its 
pre-World War II diplomacy policy, the United States was clearly committed to match 
Soviet Union power by aiding in the growth of democratic countries that could add to the 
economic strength of the west. Eventually becoming an unstated part of the Transatlantic 
charter, containment was, at its core, fundamentally in agreement with article X’s open-
door policy and a key guiding force behind NATO.  
Far from the post-war American desire to bring the troops home, this new policy 
of containment had a dramatic effect on oversees deployments, the size of the military 
and the strategy driving it. It was not, however, in itself a troop stationing policy but a 
guiding principle that would allow changes in post-war stationing. Both of the projects 
toward European economic stability helped drive closer collaboration between the two 
continents but, it was the work of Bevin in regards to a possible future alliance for peace 
that Marshal found particularly interesting, and how it would ultimately drive basing 
changes45. The Truman doctrine contributed to article II, and combined with goals of 
economic recovery, burden sharing and several key events, to lead to dramatic shifts in 
military spending and employment of US troops to both Greece and Spain.  
                                                 
43 Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-
1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993 p. 309  
44 Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York.: Oxford 
University Press, 1989 p xii.  
45Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: Statesman. New York, NY.: Penguin Books, 1987. p 316.  
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B. ARTICLES III AND X AND THREATS TO THE ALLIANCE  
Even after publicly announcing that the Truman doctrine was to be the policy of 
the future, the United States still had not committed itself to long-term stationing in 
Europe or a strategy of shipping troops around the globe.  While many different reasons 
exist, three of the primary factors needed by the allies were a strong reason to make such 
a commitment, proof that others were willing to share in the burden, and internal support 
within the individual countries to expend large amounts of money toward the alliance. 
Above all the United States, still leery of entering into long-term involvement, had 
already extended its hand toward re-creating Europe economically. However, this action 
was done precisely to keep the United States out of any long-term troop stationing in the 
continent, not to encourage it. In terms of an alliance that would require the White House 
to sends troops back into Europe, major outside influences were needed to change US 
public and political perception.  
Fear of communist expansion and concern over Germany’s possible growth and 
re-armament encouraged European countries, striving for a peaceful future, to look for a 
common defense. The creation of NATO, from its roots as a security alliance and the 
inherent economic implications of that alliance, led to an easy transition into a military 
role46.  
Mutual collaboration and work toward an alliance began with the perception that 
without a strong military alliance, protection from military threat in Europe was not 
possible47. Bevin’s call for a common defense was influenced by outside events such as a 
communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the Berlin Blockade. The 
French, originally concerned with the need for all of the allies to work toward controlling 
Germany, joined other counties in the Brussels treaty in an effort to restore their former 
grandeur. Soon after joining, they realized that the force of the Western Union were not 
enough to handle the Soviets48. All of the signals being sent by the Soviets seemed to be 
contrary to the peaceful future the West was trying so hard to build. Soviet activities, 
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such as their attempted forced treaty of mutual defense with Finland, made it clear that 
action was needed to prevent collapse of the entire recovering system in Europe49.  
While other factors supported the plan for a treaty, Kissinger asserts that none had 
the impact on allied countries like the actions that were being taken by the Soviet 
Union50. The actions of Stalin were particularly worrisome to countries involved in the 
treaty of Brussels, and it was fear that made them willing to join an alliance with a more-
powerful, outside force51. Many experts agreed that their small alliance alone was not 
nearly enough to stop a large Soviet invasion52.  
All of these actions led Marshall to bring to the President Bevin’s idea of an 
alliance based on mutual goals and collective defense. The president agreed with the idea 
of a collaboration of democracies for peace53. While the threat from the Soviet Union 
was clearly sufficient to demonstrate to the European countries that a military alliance, 
and in some ways basing, was necessary, it was not enough by itself to bring the United 
States on board. Concerned with becoming involved in another European war, the 
American public and congress were weary of any pact that would automatically get them 
involved. Keeping western Europe strong, however, was understood by many as vital to 
success on both sides of the Atlantic, and it was this that finally turned the argument.  
Dean Acheson’s primary concern was that the small but growing number of 
countries involved in the European alliance  needed continued positive growth, and that it 
would not be possible unless the Union were to exist at the center of a broader Atlantic 
community54. He felt that without this kind of relationship, all would fail. He knew that a 
strong WEU would mean a stronger overall alliance and a more peaceful world. A weak 
WEU, on the other hand, would only cause turmoil55 and lead to world problems. He 
wanted the WEU to stay strong to make the free world more economically stable. This 
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attitude, shared by the Truman administration, led the United States to approaching the 
thought of an alliance in a new way.  
Ironically the United States’ desire to remain uninvolved in an alliance that would 
work toward reducing aggression eventually directed the concept of the charter. Instead 
of being focused on violence, American participation in the project guaranteed focus on 
values and solutions for peace (instead of the calculations of national security that had 
formally been used to ensure European security)56. This was the only way that it could 
have been sold to the United States. The benefits of this situation and its impact on the 
overall treaty were great. According to Thomas, the notions of self help and mutual aid 
formed the conceptual foundation for the north Atlantic treaty,57 soviet aggression and 
control of Germany were left out. The US Senate greeted the charter because it upheld 
principle and was not directed against a particular country. Instead, it was directed solely 
against aggression58. Also popular with the senate was the fact that the charter was not a 
mechanism to influence any shifting balance of power but strengthened the balance of 
principle59. The lack of wanting to become involved in a military alliance, combined with 
knowledge that Europeans needed the United States for peace, created an alliance based 
on shared values and harmony. With this, there now evolved a charter that could spread 
strong economic growth and mutually shared desires for peace60.  
European and American fears of Soviet expansion, while not being named, found 
their way into the charter through several different articles. This is precisely what led to 
oversees basing. Ideas behind positive economic growth of the alliance led to both 
articles II, and X, and together with articles III and V (the mutual protection and defense 
articles), the alliance had in place the ideas that were to bring about eventual basing 
changes and later, ideas of burden sharing and debates among allies.  
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C. GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT: KEY TO THE CHARTER AND US LONG-
TERM INVOLVEMENT 
An increase in US troop deployments brought about questions that had, until that 
time, only vaguely been dealt with by the members of the alliance. Foremost among these 
questions was the issue of France and arms to Germany and other allies. France, still 
recovering from the effects World War II, was extremely concerned with allowing West 
Germany to arm. Zimmerman refers to this question as the major stumbling block of the 
entire NATO organization in its early years61. Amazingly, just 10 years after the end of 
WWII, the allies were forced to deal with integrating West Germany into the overall 
defensive structure of NATO62 and granting the country sovereignty. The US and UK 
reasoned that creating West Germany as a sovereign country and a member of NATO not 
only meant another partner in the alliance, but justified the defensive work and base 
creation that was already in progress. For reasons that were political as well as economic, 
the United States was set on carrying out this plan. In terms of article III’s call for 
continuous work among the members “to develop their individual and collective capacity 
to resist armed attack”63, building Germany’s defense capability would be unavoidable if 
they were to become a member of NATO. Strategically, to develop a strong defense in 
Western Europe, members of the alliance would have no choice but to begin the re-
armament of Western Germany or dedicate large amounts of assets to defend it. Initially, 
much of Europe was nervous but tolerant of the idea64. The French, in 1949, however, 
were set against ever allowing such a thing to happen. 
D. KOREAN WAR AND ARTICLES II, III, X SOLIDIFY OVERSEES 
BASING 
When the US Senate approved joining the alliance, significantly changing the 
basing strategy of the nations was not an advertised part of the plan. Instead, it was 
something that quickly happened, more out of necessity than out of any kind of pre-
planned wide-ranging strategic concept. Similar to the circumstances surrounding the 
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creation of NATO, the activities that led the United States to increase its contingent in 
Europe, and in turn, to shoulder a larger portion the defense burden, were a combination 
of events unforeseen at the time of the original signing. As already discussed, world 
events heightened both the importance of European security and America’s protection of 
it. The alliance, formed during times of peace for the purposes of peace, became an actual 
entity during times of war. Meeting for the first time on July 25, 1950, at a time when the 
young alliance was already struggling to fashion an effective response to the Korean 
War65, the council of NATO was focused (as it had been from its inception) on the cold 
war and how to make its members safer. Already concerned with communist aggression 
and expansionism, the Korean war demonstrated the global threat of communism and 
provided the political momentum required to overcome congressional resistance to the 
substantial deployment of US ground forces in Europe66.  
The reasons were obvious. Once the alliance was set, the priority was not only to 
build on its economic prowess, but to protect investments being made by all of the 
countries involved. Korea heightened the need for self protection and asset preservation. 
As said by Thies, “the widely shared fear that Korea was but a prelude to war in Europe, 
concentrated the attention of governments on both sides of the Atlantic on the urgent 
need for more forces in Western Europe”67. The countries realized that what was needed 
was fast action with regard to the Western European defense structure. As said by 
Acheson in December of 1950, “it is action which counts and not further resolutions or 
further plans or further meetings”68. US troop basing in Europe was on the way.  
The political maneuvering from 1950 to 1955 that fostered the change in NATO’s 
perception of its basing is quite astounding. As previously mentioned, with the future 
economic prosperity of Europe as the central goal, both America and Britain agreed that 
West Germany would eventually be needed to shoulder more, if not all, of the burden for 
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its defense69. Economically, the cost of occupation was becoming high and thoughts of a 
prolong presence were out of the question. With the outbreak of the Korean War, it 
became even more imperative economically for the US and UK to convince others that a 
re-armed West Germany was vital to NATO’s defensive structure70.  
In September 1950, Acheson confronted the NATO partners with the US intention 
of permitting and pursuing the partial reconstruction of Germany’s military ability to use 
it in the defense of the West71. The United States made it clear that eventual German 
participation in the defense of Europe was critical to US participation in that defense. The 
biggest challenge in this plan was to convince the French that arming Germany was both 
a viable option and in their best interest. In 1950, in response to the American plan, the 
French proposed the Plevan Plan, which would integrate the armed forces of the region 
and thus prevent the need for Germany to have independent armed forces72. Additionally, 
since the plan would have given the French controlling interest in both the European 
Defense Community and the European Security force, it would have meant management 
of any token German troops serving in it73. Control of Germany’s re-armament was 
always the key issue for the French and is ultimately what caused the United States to 
change its course. While not completely supporting the plan, the United States found it at 
least a move in the right direction toward Germany’s rearmament. In 1954, after years of 
debating the European Defense Community and its Security Force structure, the French 
parliament voted against acceptance of the Plevan Plan, and the French were thus forced 
deal with the fact that economically and strategically—arming Germany made sense. The 
French needed assurance that their security interests were being considered, as well as the 
interests of the rest of NATO. After much political wrangling, what solidified the deal 
was a proposal submitted by Acheson.  
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The French agreed to Germany’s acceptance into NATO when Acheson proposed 
a package deal explicitly linking the feasibility of US troop commitments to West 
German rearmament74, a package that greatly enlarged the American and British regional 
commitments while providing for German military growth. Oversight of West German 
rearmament being their biggest concern, the French were only satisfied when the United 
States agreed to supervise West Germany’s growing military structure with a long-term 
troop deployment of their own75. The US contingent then took on a two-pronged political 
role.  First, the United States would be the chief supplier and overseer of West 
Germany’s growing military might, capable of developing a new NATO ally, while 
providing the presence needed to ensure France that it was safe from its armed neighbor. 
Secondly, they performed their NATO role of ensuring that allies remained safe from any 
armed Soviet aggression76. At an early stage, therefore, the commitment seemed to have 
relatively little to do with demonstrating the consequences of Soviet adventurism and 
much to do with European anxieties77 over US presence and its relation to German 
rearmament. The Korean War forced the allies to deal with such problems78, but it also 
added burden sharing as a new problem to the quickly maturing alliance.  
E. ARTICLES AND BURDEN SHARING 
At the war’s end, what was difficult for the US to do was to convince their allies 
that they needed to continue spending while the United States began making cuts. 
Although the perfect situation for the United States, which would have been to provide 
only air and naval assets to the alliance79, never fully arose, the bulk of the Cold War saw 
the European allies prepared to field even or greater numbers of ground troops than the 
Americans. This seems to make sense in light of the fact that air force jets, large navies 
and nuclear weapons are so costly to maintain and deploy. They were a smaller 
percentage of the total US expenditure, yet still out of reach for the smaller budgets of the 
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allies. The outcome of this unstated burden sharing bargain was still evident in a 1988 US 
Department of Defense annual report to congress that stated that while the NATO allies 
accounted for less than 50% of the economic wealth of the total alliance, they maintained 
over 3.5 million troops on active duty, and in the event of a war, would have provided 
roughly 60% of NATO’s total ground combat power80. Articles II, III and X collided 
with the threat that came from the Korean War and produced a Europe willing to accept 
German re-armament, a Europe that was fully involved in different types of burden 
sharing arrangements with the United States. However, the biggest change in Europe, 
aside from their own spending increase, was the large influx of American troops and 
military spending. 
The US effort to add to Europe’s collective capacity to resist armed attack was 
extensive. Driven by the collision of supporting events, the United States would provide 
large deployments and place troops within an integrated NATO command structure81. 
Overall NATO forces in Western Europe grew from 15 division and less than 1000 
aircraft in April 1951 to 35 divisions and 3000 aircraft by the end of 195182. America’s 
part in this increase was enormous.  
America’s post-war reduction lowered its total force to 1.46 million by 195083. Of 
that force, only 122,000 were serving in Europe when the Korean War broke out84. The 
change came very fast, as between May and December 1951, 4 US divisions moved to 
Europe85.  Total US military forces in France shot from 802 troops in 1950 to almost 
45,000 by 1954, the majority of which, 30 thousand troops, being in the Army86. West 
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Germany, the center of the defensive structure, billeted 407 thousand active-duty US 
troops by 1954, an increase of almost 350% from the 97 thousand troops that were there 
in 195087. The Army was not the only branch to experience massive growth in the 
country. With a growing importance being placed on nuclear weapons, the US Air Force 
also underwent large increases. In France alone, the Air Force grew from 169 personnel 
on site in 1950 to almost 40,000 in 195388. Overall, the Air Force in Europe tripled 
during this time from 28,000 in 1950 to 120,000 in 195389. Clearly, the largest proportion 
of troops were coming from the United States, and integrating this massive defense, made 
up of so many different countries, posed a problem.  
When NATO was created it lacked a major command and control structure and 
was oriented more toward planning90. With the invasion of Korea, leaders of NATO were 
forced to take a look at the inadequate command and control structure and lack of ability 
resist precisely the kind of attack that article III was intended to prevent. At the council’s 
second meeting, along with creating basic plans for the integrated Europe’s defense force, 
plans were developed for a central command authority that would ensure that national 
units allocated were properly trained and integrated into the force91.  
The United States accepted the responsibility of filling the post of NATO’s 
Supreme Commander92 and spearheaded most of this project. By 1954, the articles that 
had been agreed upon during NATO’s inception had led to the United States becoming an 
essential part in the planning, controlling and manning most of the alliance’s activities.    
Toward the middle of the 1950s, the transition was complete. Shared goals for an 
economically stable environment for the United States and its allies led to article II of the 
NATO charter, and realization that peace was dependent on the alliance’s ability to 
protect itself led to article III. These two, combined with article V, eventually guided the 
                                                 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid.  
90 Duke, Simon W. US Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1993 p 15.  
91 Duke, Simon W. US Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-1970. Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1993. p 17.  
92Ibid p 18.  
21 
United States down its path of picking up a large portion Europe’s defense.  Positioning 
troops in both Greece and Spain became part of this growing role.  
It is clear that the major basing trends of the United States, in Europe, changed 
dramatically when a Korean-War scenario was applied to Europe. The articles, agreed to 
and created by the allies for the reasons discussed, led the United States to dedicate vast 
resources to NATO’s defense and to become a driving force behind NATO’s cold war 
leadership.  The next two chapters will look at this growing leadership role and assess 
what drove the US to make the decisions it made in regards to Greece and Spain.  In both 
cases the US entered into basing agreements with authoritarian regimes possessing 
differing levels of democracy.  Lessons were learned from both endeavors that were 
either forgotten or misunderstood.  In both cases, some of the long term political effects 
of the partnership were not positive.  Now, as the US is entering into basing agreements 
with Kyrgyzstan, it is time to re-look at these decisions in order to insure similarly poor 
results, in terms of US perceptions within the country receiving the assistance, are not the 


























III. COOPERATION WITH THE JUNTA OF GREECE AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON BASING IN THE REGION 
In 1952, three years after the creation of NATO, the United States and Greece 
entered into a broad basing agreement which built on America’s growing role in the Cold 
war while aiding Greek reconstruction. The agreement was beneficial to both countries, 
while containing very few constraints on US forces. Just over a decade later, in April of 
1967, a military coup turned the political environment in Greece upside down and 
brought into question not only the original stated goals of the Truman doctrine but the 
long-term strategic goals of NATO as well. The questions that ultimately need to be 
answered are: Why did the United States forgo prior political objectives for near-term 
strategic goals, and how did this affect the long-term basing and political relationship 
between the counties? While many aspects surrounding this situation are important, the 
history of Greece from WWI to the take over by the junta is of particular interest to the 
story of how US basing and the strategic interests of NATO drove allied dealings with 
Greece once the Junta came to power. The saga of US basing in Greece is a story of 
interdependence between the two countries that began soon after the US began sending 
aid. The leadership of Greece found that for economic reasons, US presence and 
assistance was critical, while the US, for pre-stated strategic goals, was forced into 
supporting any government that came to power.  
A. WORLD WAR I TO US PARTICIPATION  
The tumultuous era of post WWI Europe had as much of a direct long-term 
impact on the people of Greece as in the rest of Europe. This poor economic situation 
created both the need for US support in the region, as well as a scenario in which 
dependence on economic aid would necessitate just the kind of long-term presence that 
the Greek people would come to resent.  
Like other counties in the region, Greece was plagued with unemployment and 
economic problems far greater than they were ready to handle. Shortly after the war, the 
communist party began to grow, as revolutionary doctrines and cries of future equality 
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became appealing to many93. The monarchist government and the prime ministers 
appointed by it tried to keep communist supporters in check with promises of 
improvements; however, the great depression of 1929 put an end to hopes the 
government had for a stable future. In 1936, after defaulting on international loans94 and 
experiencing years of economic and political turmoil, a coup sent President Venizelos 
into exile and placed General Ioannis Metaxas in command95. Metaxas’s tenure ushered 
in more than a decade of havoc in Greece and carried the country, politically, far from the 
democratic entity it would one day strive to become96.  
Interestingly, General Metaxas, in an effort to avoid becoming involved in the 
growing conflict of WWII, discouraged the early alliances that might have helped protect 
Greece from the carnage that was to come. In 1941, his neutrality goals ended as an 
aggressive Italian force marched halfway through his country. Even though Greece was 
able to stop the Italians and eventually drive them back to Albania, the process of being 
attacked convinced Metaxas of the need for an alliance with a powerful force. His goals 
of finding an ally to offset German power were exactly what eventually brought major 
US support to the region. Direct US support, however, was not the first step in Greece’s 
interaction with NATO. What came first was British intervention in the region. British 
influence, the true forbearer of American aid, began as assistance in an effort to defend 
against what looked like an impending German invasion. Sadly, differing views on how 
to use the force hindered rapid defensive deployment, and the small British contingent 
alone was not enough to defend the country. In April 1941, several months after British 
entrance into the region, Hitler’s troops marched through Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on 
there way to Greece. The German force, overwhelming in its firepower and ability to 
maneuver, made quick work of the Greek and British forces and defense prepared on the 
“Metaxas line” quickly fell97. The need for real assistance, in terms of money, food, and 
military aid, had only just begun.   
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Similar to other strategic alliances and desperate pacts throughout history, in 
WWII “the enemy of our enemy was our friend,” and in Greece, this age-old slogan came 
back to haunt the British after the Germans were defeated. With the end of Nazi 
occupation being their goal, British support (in the forms of money and arms as well as 
troops) poured in during the occupation years. The United Kingdom, supported the Greek 
government as well as anyone else fighting the Germans, to include communist and other 
insurgents. While resistance numbers in Greece grew overall, the pro-communist 
movement swelled to more than 60,000 supporters before the war came to an end98. 
Thus, the stage was set in 1944 for a civil war, and when the Germans retreated, the 
internal powers were well equipped and ready to turn on each other. The United 
Kingdom, formally the benefactor to both of the contributing sides, unable either to stop 
the conflict or to fully fund a successful counter communist force, turned to the United 
States for help with the problem. The stage was set for US intervention.  
B. GREEK CIVIL WAR AND ITS CONNECTION TO FOREIGN AID 
The already serious civil war fighting was turned into a cauldron of conflicting 
ideologies as British and Soviet funds worked to subsidize opposing forces. The post 
WWII civil war augmented the already poor economic state of the country and created 
horrible carnage at a time when the rest of Europe was trying to re-build. Hurt worst of 
all in this chaos were the civilians, who, along with the rest of Europe (which was in 
shambles) truly had no place to go. By the end of 1949, nearly a tenth of the population, 
having had their villages completely destroyed, was in need of new homes99. 
Hyperinflation became so bad in many parts of the country that a lack of confidence in 
Greek currency became the norm, and an economic barter system became common place. 
 Driving the situation further into chaos was a completely destroyed 
communications system. Most cities had no way of communicating with the outside 
world100. The economy was a wreck, more than 25% of all buildings were destroyed, and 
the total capital stock loss totaled 8.5 billion dollars US dollars101. Overall, the country 
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was in shambles and was in dire need of help from the outside. With only two Western 
Allied nations still able to supply any aid after the war, continued aid from the United 
Kingdom as well as additional help from the United States became more important as the 
conflict rolled on.  
UN aid from 1944 to 1947, mostly from Britain, totaled 287 million US dollars. 
Its make up, half of which was military aid and the other half being for emergency food 
aid and other goods, significantly helped the suffering economy. American intervention, 
which had been present but small during this period, was increased in 1947 as the United 
Kingdom, due to financial problems of their own, bowed out of the conflict and left the 
United States as the region’s primary non-communist benefactor.  
Along with its humanitarian goals, US aid in Greece represented American 
participation in a growing conflict of a new kind. The Marshall plan’s assistance to 
Greece (and later, the Truman doctrine’s) was indicative of Greece’s growing strategic 
role in the cold war and the bi-polar world that was developing. Additionally, and most 
importantly, these acts were a step, on the part of the United States, toward being 
involved in a European country, during a non-wartime period, for the purpose of creating 
and maintaining stability. The US government made it clear that the location was of vital 
importance, and for that reason, was prepared to allocate substantial amounts of aid to 
ward off communist aggression102. Were it not for other strategic world events occurring 
during this time, this would never have been the case. In the early 1950s, such events as 
the Korean War, the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test, and their aggressive actions toward 
their satellite countries all solidified the vital importance of US presence.  
The steadily rising global conflict between the east and the west could not have 
come at a better time in terms of the United States being willing to help the nationalists of 
Greece rid themselves of the communist insurgency. The Truman doctrine opened the 
door for other beneficial forms of aid, and soon money targeted at economic 
improvements, along with troops, began to flow into the country103.  
                                                 
102 Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-
1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993 p. 310 
103 Ibid. p 309.  
27 
Basing in the region was a natural step in the development of Greece as a strategic 
location in the NATO alliance. Interest in the region had grown for a variety of reasons 
including Greece’s proximity to the northern coasts of Africa and the Middle East, as 
well as NATO’s growing nervousness about Soviet expansionism. Additionally, Greece’s 
location in the center of the Mediterranean made it a very attractive potential naval and 
air force hub104 for US forces looking to increase their global presence.  
American aid did not go unanswered. In return for the Civil War help and 
reconstruction aid, the Greek government graciously signed a friendly basing agreement 
that was as advantageous to the US as it was to NATO105. It was an agreement that 
offered no restrictions to the US regarding military operations other than confining their 
deployments to areas within NATO’s field of operations106. In another signal of loyalty 
to the alliance, after Greece became a part of NATO, it assigned almost 90-95% of its 
armed forces to the alliance, demonstrating a strong commitment to the United States and 
western Europe107. The initial aid from the United States hastened an end to the civil war 
and facilitated a solid beginning for the new government of Greece. The overall 
magnitude of the basing and its importance to the NATO strategic structure, however, 
was really the driving force behind US presence once the government failed and the Junta 
came to power. Thus, the seeds of the mutual dependence that would later tear US-Greek 
relations apart, were set when the United States first entered into an agreement in the 
region.  
C. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FOREIGN AID  
When the US stepped in, it was clear that American intentions were not solely 
humanitarian. The secondary agenda (which clearly was to utilize Greece’s strategic 
location as an outpost) may have been the true driving force behind the reciprocal 
relationship that was created through American presence. After all, if the United States 
had been focused solely on providing aid and assistance during and after the civil war, 
                                                 
104 Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989. p 161.  
105 Ibid.  
106 Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-
1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. p. 317. 
107 Ibid. p 314.  
28 
would any of it have continued during the reign of the Junta? Thus, we can say that the 
prolonged aid associated with basing was truly the beginning of what we consider to be a 
major problem in US/Greek relations. As Walter Lippman remarked, Greece was 
selected, along with Turkey, “not because they are especially in need of relief, not 
because they are shining examples of democracy. . . but because they are the strategic 
gateway to the Black Sea and the heart of the Soviet Union”108.  
What is imperative to understand about the aid is that without the military help 
offered by the United States, the recovery that had begun with UK support prior to 1947 
never would have continued. Also, assisting Greece in its recovery was the country’s 
slow movement toward being accepted as an associate partner into the European 
Economic Community. While this formal agreement did not begin until 1962109, trading 
with European partners began shortly after the end of the Greek civil war and was 
important on driving up demand and supporting the recovery of Greek’s agriculture 
sector.110 Additionally, Greece becoming a key country in the stand against communist 
aggression meant that the aid associated with the US military remaining in the region 
would continue for some time.  Therefore, it was the economic assistance that 
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Figure 1.   US Assistance to Greece111 
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Figure 1 shows the amounts of money flowing into Greece from the United 
States. During this period, US aid totaled 1.5 billion, most of which was economic but a 
good portion was military. By 1966, had Greece received a total of 4.6 billion; 26% of 
this was for military purposes112. All told, during this time, 4 major bases and twenty 
smaller facilities were constructed. The infrastructure built in Greece was substantial. The 
most important of these was the port built in Souda Bay, Crete, which served as key 
submarine base for the United States113.  
In 1953, partly as a result of US aid and partly as a result of entering into NATO, 
Greece began to make the internal changes necessary to develop a solid economic base 
which would continue to support their economic growth. To encourage foreign 
investment, the Papagos administration, the first elected after the civil war114, established 
rules making it easier for outsiders to have a controlling share of businesses115. Papagos’s 
administration spoke openly about the advantages of a liberal economy, free enterprise, 
and a free market economy—all lessons learned from the United States and the post-war 
developing European countries. The plan behind deregulating foreign investment rules in 
Greece was to strive for an increase in demand which would support the highest level of 
employment, and in doing so raise the standard of living116. Dealings with the US drove 
this ideology. According to Williams, “This entire philosophy, which was instrumental in 
the recovery, was a derivative of the anticommunist political ideology found in American 
influence and was prevalent during the recovery”117. This policy, established by the 
government of Alexander Papagos and based on principles from the United States, was 
followed by all subsequent governments118 leading up to the Junta.  
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Aided by US influenced policies and strong regional growth, per person GNP rose 
in Greece from 632 US dollars in 1962 to 4380 in 1980. Western Europe’s recovery 
between 1950-1973, still referred to by many as “the Golden Years,” was one of the 
longest prolonged periods of growth and prosperity in the region’s history119. A 
convergence of factors inside and outside of the area is credited with creating this 
positive shift in the economic situation. First, and vital to the recovery, experts point to 
the very cheap, high-quality labor that was available in the region. Local labor unions 
were able to adapt existing European work and labor standards with imported technology 
to create success120. When spurred by the world-wide investments that followed the 
Marshal Plan, overall productivity grew and demand quickly followed. The fact that low-
cost, high-quality labor was essential to the recovery created a unique phenomenon that 
enabled the poorest of countries, in this case Greece and Spain, to witness a very 
powerful growth121.  


















Figure 2.   Per Person GDP Growth in Europe 
 
As shown in the above graph, while Greece’s per person GNP change was only a 
percentage point above those of Spain and Portugal, it was nearly 50% greater than that 
of France as well as many other European countries122. This period of rapid change 
greatly influenced Greece but still left it behind most of its European neighbors in terms 
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of overall living conditions123. Sweden, for example, was the richest country before the 
recovery period, and after 23 years of averaging of only 3.1% per person GDP growth per 
year (low compared with the rest of Europe), they remained one of Europe’s wealthiest 
countries. Greece, however, coming from such a state of utter destruction, greatly noticed 
its improvements in both productivity and economic growth as compared with other 
countries that had begun the period in much better shape.  
A second factor that helped the region was the increase in cross-country trade all 
of Europe enjoyed during the recovery period. Brought on by a new sense of friendliness, 
countries participating in the European Economic Community were focused on mutual 
success and productivity124 instead of war and destruction. This factor, more so than all 
the others, really made the post WWII economic recovery work for its participants. 
Demand grew as labor-rich countries were able to continually produce and build more. 
Thus, and environment was established in Europe that was perfect for Europe and the rest 
of the world to reap the benefits of recovery.  
Improvements also were represented by the changes that Greek society underwent 
during this time. As a share of overall GDP, the industrial sector rose from 26% in 1962 
to 32% in 1979, while that of agriculture dropped from 23% to 18%125. As previously 
mentioned, the United States was key to this successful growth in terms not of only aid 
but also of ideology. According to Psilos, “the foreign assistance received by Greece 
undoubtedly influenced the rate of productivity in Greece in many ways”126. Association 
with the United States not only facilitated faster growth, but it made Greece a partner 
with the largest trading member of the western alliance.  
Years before the Junta came to power, the importance of relationships with 
trading partners was felt, and proven, as demand in other countries drove internal 
production and became associated with their own GDP growth. What is key to this 
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relationship and needs highlighting is the fact that after the Junta came to power, thier 
dynamic relationship with the United States would only grow in importance, for it was 
the relationship with the United States that helped maintain demand after many western 
European powers cut off relations with Greece. Known to the leaders of Greece was the 
fact that at the heart of this relationship was basing, which kept the large, benevolent 
trading partner interested in the enterprise.  Before the US became involved in Greece it 
was struggling to become a democracy.  Strategic location of the country and its 
integration into NATO’s overall defensive posture quickly made it vital.  Therefore, years 
before the Junta came to power, an environment was set in place that would almost 
guarantee that the United States would forsake its originally stated goals of promoting 
democracy in the region for one of maintaining its bases there. The government of 
Greece needed the United States, just as the United States needed Greece for its strategic 
location.  
D. NUCLEAR ARRANGEMENTS STRENGTHEN THE BOND 
In return for all this cooperation, the United States eventually established seven 
bases in the region and, from 1949 to 1969, provided 2 billion in military aid127. In the 
late 1950s, nuclear weapons presented the only sticking point to the agreements between 
the United States and Greece. The Greek population, concerned with the negative 
complications that inherently accompany nuclear arsenals, was not happy with this new 
weaponry being situated on their homeland. With the help of NATO allies, the United 
States was able to convince the Greeks of the necessity of this basing, and on December 
30, 1959, a secret agreement was signed to establish nuclear depots in NATO’s newest 
member128. Under the agreement, the Greeks would have control of the launch pads, 
while the US would control and maintain the missiles, thus mutual agreement would be 
needed for any nuclear decision129. The final details of the plan were worked out, and a 
nuclear arrangement—one that would come to be one of the most important aspects of 
the alliance—was in place.  
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Quickly forgotten, however, once nuclear weapons were part of the picture, was 
the fact that in 1946, before any aid began, the US government stated clearly that it 
expected the Greek government to continually prove that it was not oligarchic and 
reactionary and that its population was continuously seeing democratic improvements130. 
As serious as this breach would turn out to be for the people of Greece, it was not to be 
the only original goal overlooked for strategic purposes. In terms of NATO and the 
lasting pact made among members, the preamble to the Atlantic Treaty specifies that 
parties “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of 
their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law”131. Additionally, once a member of NATO, the population of Greece could have 
counted on Article II’s promise that all the signatory governments would “contribute 
toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by 
strengthening their free institutions. . . and by promoting conditions of stability and well-
being”132 to ensure that their democratic growth would continue. Unfortunately, for the 
people of Greece, none of these pre-existing and pre-arranged guardians of democratic 
principles would prove indestructible. Nuclear weapons, as well as Greece’s strategic 
location in the scenario of a growing cold war, made these original goals very hard to 
uphold after the arrival of the Junta and their level of authoritarianism was pitted against 
the will of the United States and the US stand against the Soviets.  
E. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS SURROUNDING THE ARRIVAL OF 
THE “JUNTA”  
The unique situation of divided nationalism and torn loyalties that led to the 
military taking power in 1967 was infused into the Greek society years before the event. 
What must be remembered is that members of the Junta, due to the torn loyalties that had 
existed between them and some of Greece’s civilian leadership, fully thought what they 
were doing was best for the country and for the armed forces as a whole. Prior to the civil 
war, there already existed in the country a background of disagreement between 
Republicans (those who believed a republic would be best for Greece) and those who 
                                                 
130 Duke, Simon W. and Krieger, Wolfgang. U.S. Military Forces in Europe, The Early Years, 1945-
1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993. p 310.  
131 NATO Office of Information and Press. NATO Handbook. Brussels, Belgium: 2001. p. 527 
132 Ibid. p. 527 
34 
supported the monarchy133. The Greek monarchy was in fact created by outside powers 
and feelings that the monarchy was inadequate had been long standing in the country, as 
many people saw them as nothing more than a transplant from other great powers with 
very little, if any, legitimate authority to rule.  
The military ideology of Greece, and the history of how the Military dealt with 
civilian authorities is also vital to the story.  The military, while at times supporting the 
monarchy, usually supported the side that backed ideals of a republic134. Such were the 
views behind the 1909 coup of General Venizelos whose leadership had a tremendous 
impact on the belief system and makeup of the officer corp. During his reign, attempts to 
exert power into the Balkan wars extended the role of the Army and opened its officer 
corps up to a different class of soldiers. Prior officers had been from land-owning or 
upper classes. During Venizelos’s tenure, in order to raise the additional troop numbers 
needed to watch over the frontiers, the army began allowing poor and lower classes of 
people to serve. This did not lower the professionalism of the corps. It did, however, over 
time, alter its political perspective from being generally conservative and not interested in 
active politics to being more open to political association and involvement135. Thus, the 
ideology of the military was created and developed at a time when a strong military 
leader had taken political control of the country in order to protect it. The members of the 
Junta would use this lesson learned to later serve purposes of their own. 
Thirty-five years later, the German occupation and communist insurgency brought 
all of this together as royalists and republicans joined to fight against the communists. 
This had a drastic effect on the officer corps as nationalism, loyalty to the king, became a 
defining trait for all active officers and a key to recruiting. This attempt of the corps, to 
purge itself of any republican views, sent much of its leadership into clandestine 
organizations, groups that were not fully against their political leaders, but still leery of 
monarchical legitimacy. This view among many army officers was both brought to the 
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forefront and solidified when, in July of 1965136, in an effort to avoid scandal involving 
the son of Prime Minister Papandreou, an accused leftist who was being considered for 
the role of Defense Minister, the King, Constantine II, began to take direct action in 
parliament137. His actions drove Papandreou from office and began the chain of events 
that directly led to the Junta. By hand selecting and controlling the three successors to the 
popular prime minister, King Constantine brought the legitimacy of himself and the 
parliament into question, weakend civilian control of the military, and heightened the 
already apathetic view that the population of Greece had toward its parliament and the 
King138.  
Most people in Greece were more concerned with the economy and felt that the 
King’s meddling with parliament was responsible for some of their economic problems. 
This apathy toward who was in charge made it easier for the Junta to take control. After 
18 months of not being able to resolve crises of continuously changing Prime Ministers, 
King Constantine, in order to restore order, announced that new elections were to take 
place in May of 1967139. Before the elections could take place, and to the surprise of high 
ranking generals as well as the king, the Junta took charge in a rapid, well-executed coup. 
The group that took power, known as the Junta, were a collection of Army Colonels who 
were led by Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. One can only assume that the fractured 
government and its failure to handle the previous 18 months of political turmoil played 
into the hands of the colonel’s who assumed power considering themselves the caretakers 
of Greece. Shortly after taking power, in an effort to solidify support of much of the 
government and other military leaders alike, the leaders of the putsch used their need to 
ensure that communists were not able to take power as their reasoning for taking 
power140. Contrary to the Junta’s reasoning that a military take over would be better than 
the communist taking power, no evidence of anything close to a communist power 
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struggle has ever been produced141 and in the time since the coup many have proven the 
idea of a communist take over to be totally manufactured142.  
Something completely different appears to be the impetus of the takeover. First, 
engineers of the coup were aware that their membership in the western alliance was 
important because it ensured that the interest of Greece, or what they perceived to be 
Greek interest, would be protected by the United States. Additionally, it ensured that, 
through the basing and military aid that had already began, a sizable army would be 
maintained and developed143. Also know is the fact that Andreas Papandreou, who was 
the clear poll leader in the upcoming May election, was campaigning on a Greek 
nationalist stance that presented a “Gaullist” approach to NATO. He felt that a neutralist 
foreign policy would increase Greek independence144. Completely disagreeing with the 
man who was possibly going to be elected as the next prime minister, before the coup 
took place, the Junta was already aware that their future, and what they thought was the 
best future for their country, rested with NATO. As can be seen by evaluating the specific 
background of the civilian-military relationship leading up to the coup, the seeds were set 
for the US-Greek co-dependent relationship of the Junta’s reign before they even came to 
power. It can be seen that the leader’s of the coup needed NATO and alliance 
membership, just as the United States and its allies needed association with Greece.  
F. THE “JUNTA” AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Action taken by the colonels was swift. Proclamations made in the first couple of 
months included outlawing all organizations and associations deemed to be a threat to the 
country145. These included labor unions, political parties, and civic and women’s clubs. 
The same month, the right wing National Unity Party found its doors closed and its leader 
arrested. Additionally, in what might have been the most direct immediate threat toward 
freedom and democracy, the Junta banned requirements allowing for elections of village 
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and municipal leaders—all of the occupations were turned over to junta-nominated 
personnel146. The junta, through propaganda and threatening tactics, passed a new 
constitution through the country that severely limited civil rights, took many powers of 
appointment away from the king, and increased the overall power of the leaders of the 
coup. Public apathy toward politics and politicians, which had developed during the prior 
three years of turmoil leading up to the putsch, enabled the document to pass with a 95% 
majority. The new document was in place and active in the country before many really 
knew of its possible negative effects. Once in place, any opposition lost its ability to fight 
back147.  
Effects on the economy were not as rapid, but in the long run, they were equally 
as devastating. The junta initially used the excess growth of the previous decade to justify 
their expansionary monetary policies and protectionist actions. Conditions in the country 
dropped, as three years into their reign, inflation was up to World War II highs and the 
consumer price index was skyrocketing. Oversees, US papers were full of reports on 
atrocities and torture being committed by the regime148. In a matter of years, the junta 
managed to destroy most of the things that the United States and the democratically 
oriented leadership of Greece had worked toward, and the question that remains is why, 
with all of this going on, the United States continued its support. 
G. PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES OF US SUPPORT 
The United States, reliant on Greece for its vital location and role in the cold war, 
reacted to the coup in ways that clearly countered its long-term stated goals for the 
region. The ideals that had founded the relationship between the two countries were 
placed aside as the United States focused on short-term strategic objectives149 that were 
perceived to be critical to the Cold War. Interestingly, the United States did not originally 
see this as a trade off or an all-or-nothing situation; it continued to see attainment of long-
term political objectives possible. When the Colonels took over and the United States 
began to realize the dramatic changes being conducted by the administration, they 
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recognized three ways to deal with the situation. First, they could offer full support of the 
dictatorship and continue business as usual by providing the same amount of economic 
and military aid. Second, they could forgo all strategic interest in the nation and 
completely sever ties. However, a third method was selected, which was to maintain 
some support while encouraging a return to constitutional democracy150. Summed up by 
one US official shortly after the coup, “We disagree with the political system which 
prevails in Greece and consider a return to Parliamentary rule essential to the long-term 
stability and prosperity. At the same time, we must preserve our important strategic 
interests in Greece as a valuable geographic area in the critical Eastern Mediterranean 
region”151.  
Initial protest from the US government included an arms embargo along with 
major cuts in economic aid. The embargo, which was to cover all NATO counties and 
was to prevent shipments of major military items such as ships, aircraft, military 
helicopters, tanks, artillery, missiles, and ammunition152 did not last long. This embargo, 
to the surprise of Congress and NATO allies, was broken after several months by the 
State Department, which, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, decided that it was 
time for a reassessment of the situation153. The size of the arms embargo breach by the 
United States was large enough for many to see it as support for the regime. During the 
first year, the junta received F5 aircraft, F104 aircraft, other assorted boats and 
ammunition and self-propelled 155-mm and 90-mm artillery shells capable of firing 
nuclear shells from US armament depots in Greece. These shipments actually constituted 
an arms increase to the country154.  
In terms of continuing to receive the US support that helped them remain in 
power, the well-organized coup could not have come at a better time for the Junta. The 
mid to late 1960s, arguably the height of the Cold War, were a time of extremely high 
                                                 
150 Woodhouse, C.M. The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels. New York, NY: Franklin Watts 
Publishing, 1985. p 87.  
151 Duke, Simon. United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989. p 162.  
152 Ibid.  
153 Ibid.  
154 Munn, Donald C. Military Dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974): The Genesis of Greek Anti-
Americanism. Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School: Monterey, California, 198. p 159.  
39 
tensions in the east-west conflict and a time when America’s role in the ever-growing 
conflict was increasing in importance.  
First among the worldwide events having a large impact during this time was the 
French expulsion of all NATO forces in 1966. De Gaulle, concerned with the 
independence of France, was convinced that his country needed its own nuclear 
capability to best promote its own interest155. He was not happy what he perceived to be 
European dependence on the United States in terms of nuclear protection and did not 
believe that the United States was willing to risk nuclear destruction of an American city 
to defend an ally. Additionally, felt that the United States and the Soviets were working 
to collaborate together to ensure that only they controlled nuclear abilities156. Forcing 
NATO to move 70,000 troops, relocate its headquarters (then in Paris) to Belgium, and to 
evacuate approximately 190 installations157, the move by France forced the alliance’s 
remaining military to shift the defense158. France’s leaving the military portion of the 
alliance could have been seen inside and outside of NATO as a weakening in the overall 
coalition. Both the United States and the United Kingdom felt it was in their interest to 
enlarge their commitments in order to maintain the credibility of the alliance159. No one 
wanted to see it get smaller, look weaker, or appear to be falling apart.  
Also tearing at the internal workings of the alliance was the Vietnam conflict and 
US commitment to southeast Asia. Perceptions of US commitment to western Europe 
grew as the continuing war in Vietnam had a dramatic effect on US force levels in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. By 1968, two thirds of one division and a cavalry 
regiment, 28,000 troops, had redeployed back to the United States to support its Vietnam 
commitment160. After being moved out of France, the United States could not afford to 
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leave another NATO participating country, in this case Greece, at a time when its 
commitment to the alliance was being brought into question. Furthermore, working 
against the partners of the alliance in the late 1960s was a downward turn in western 
economies, which made strong cooperation among members critical to NATO’s overall 
success161.  
In 1966, for example, the Federal German economy fell into recession, and 
Chancellor Erhard was forced to seek relief from Washington in the form of asking to 
have the volume of their obligated weapons purchases lowered162. Conversely, and at a 
bad time for Germany, the US Congress was trying hard to find ways to limit money 
being spent oversees in the form of basing and troop deployments. Economic stagnation 
and the war in Vietnam were taking a toll on alliance members, but with Soviet actions 
such as the Prague spring offensive, in August 1968, the last thing that the United States 
and NATO could afford to do was appear irresolute with regard to members around the 
world. Finally, basing, it must be remembered, is a byproduct not of only membership in 
an alliance but also of strategic location, and events of the late 1960s made Greece’s 
strategic spot in the Mediterranean more important to the alliance than ever before. This 
fact, above all others, most likely secured US cooperation with the Junta.  
Two events underscored this fact. The first was the granting of over flight rights 
by the Junta to the United States during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War163. Coming shortly 
after taking power, the Junta were quick to extend a helping hand in the form of blanket 
use of landing facilities and additional basing rights, both of which the United States took 
full advantage of during the conflict. The second incident, which was a direct 
consequence of the first, was slightly greater in terms of highlighting Greece’s 
importance to the region. In 1967, in an effort to counter US vital interests in maritime 
activity in the region after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Soviet Union formed its 
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first Mediterranean sea squadron164, capable of undertaking sea-based air operations. 
With the core mission of the squadron being surveillance of the US Sixth Fleet activity, 
shadowing of carriers and detection of US ballistic-missile submarines, US presence and 
ports in the area became more important than ever165.  
The US sixth fleet greatly increased activity during this time, and in 1971, in an 
effort to lower the time sailors were spending away from home and increase retention, 
actually began home porting in Greece166. Coming at a time of particularly low junta 
popularity in Greece, this move by the navy was later seen as major support of the 
authoritarian regime. After analyzing the world events of the late 1960s, including the 
French pull out from NATO, Vietnam, economic influences, and other world conflicts, it 
is clear that many factors of Cold War friction contributed to the United States 
maintaining a relationsip with, and in some ways supporting, the Junta during their 
earliest days. Unfortunately for the United States, other factors besides military aid and 
basing added to what was seen as support of junta rule in the eyes of the people of Greece 
and the world. 
US official visits took place at regular intervals from 1969 to 1974, seemingly 
providing approval for junta activities. Strangely, while the United States continued to 
build on military-related connections, countries in Europe, which were formerly 
connected to Greece, cut off ties as soon as possible. In European diplomatic circles, even 
social contact between country representatives and the junta were discouraged and 
avoided167. In the United States, on the other hand, official visits and meetings with junta 
leadership remained common. In 1971, two US congressmen made an official visit and 
returned with stories of rough treatment toward junta rivals and authoritarianism toward 
public news services. The congressman also reported that perception was building within 
the opposition that the United States was supporting enemies instead of friends. Another 
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Senator said during an interview that “we have been disappointed in the fact that there 
has not been more progress toward the establishment of a parliamentary government”168. 
 After considering all the information, the Senate Foreign Relations committee 
felt it was bad news indeed but did not see an alternative. Reasoning that Greece was still 
a NATO member, the Senate Foreign Relations committee decided that they had no 
alternative but to continue their current and previously mentioned “two pronged 
policy”169. Ironically, Greece was still in NATO mainly due to nothing other than US 
support and influence with other allies, and it was a stunning example of circular 
reasoning for the Senate to use that as a reason to continue relations. While members of 
congress recognized problems with the US policy towards Greece and may have felt 
more was needed to encouraging democracy, the Nixon administration was sending 
nothing but positive signals.  
On April 22, 1971, Nixon’s secretary of commerce, while on an official visit to 
Greece, met with key leaders and praised both the economic and political stability of the 
country170. What needs to be highlighted from this relationship is that these activities, 
seen as positive reinforcement from the US government, added to the junta’s ability to 
claim overall legitimacy. At the same time, US western European allies, which had 
confirmed rumors of torture and other human rights violations, kicked Greece out of the 
European Council171. Over half of the countries in NATO expressed doubts about why 
Greece, which did not seem to be representing the same shared democratic values, was 
allowed to remain in the alliance. The United States, to the dismay of some countries, 
made it clear that Greece was vital to NATO security and was to remain an active 
partner172. These actions overrode the political goals that had been established prior to 
entering into basing arrangements with Greece, and because of them, the United States 
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was to suffer long-term problems during the next several decades, problems which may 
have made the short-term strategic goal appear insignificant.  
H. EFFECTS OF SUPPORT 
Successful intervention by Turkey during an attempted coup of Cyprus led to the 
downfall of the junta and restoration of the monarchy. The United States was to see rapid 
results in response to its continued junta support173.  
Prior to the coup, the US House of Representatives held a hearing before its 
Committee on Foreign Affairs to undertake a study on American policy toward Greece. 
The hearings star witness was John Zighdis, former Greek Minister of Industry prior to 
the Junta taking control. His testimony in 1974 highlighted the growing gap between the 
United States and the people of Greece and the many reasons why so many associated 
Junta authoritarianism with American basing and aid174. Along with examples of US 
support and suggestions of American aid in the coup that had brought the Junta to power, 
Zighdis hit on the number one reason why the Greek population felt such a strong 
resentment toward the same government that just 25 years earlier had helped to end the 
Greek civil war. The primary reason for the downfall in relations between the two 
countries that he was predicting was the failure of the United States to fulfill its treaty 
obligations to defend democracy and freedom within Greece175. He went further by 
saying that contrary to fighting authoritarianism, the United States had accepted, 
cooperated, and even assisted with the Greek dictators176. It was clear that US basing 
agreements with the Junta created strong anti-US sentiment. 
This was the perception present when Premier Constantine Caramanlis, the 
appointed leader of Greece, made several quick changes upon taking control. First, 
Greece pulled out of military participation in NATO. Political ties were to remain, but 
they were definitely not the same177. This action was taken as a sign that the overthrow of 
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the junta had given rise to political powers of the left, and fears existed that the backlash 
towards the United States might drive Greece closer to the Soviet Union. Secondly, and 
more devastating to the United States, the Caramanlis government, after threatening to 
kick all US forces out of the country, decided to renegotiate the basing agreement178. 
When the new basing agreement was finally completed, after much negotiating by the 
State Department, the United States was to lose 3 of its 7 key bases in Greece and pay 
and additional 700 million dollars179 over a ten-year period. Additionally, the Greeks 
gained one of their biggest requests, which was to have a Greek commander in charge of 
all four remaining bases. The United States was still in charge of overall activities, but its 
troops not allowed to move on or off post without the local commander’s authority180. 
Worst of all, the realization of the how valuable these US locations were would 
encourage almost every succeeding administration to extract significant concessions after 
any disagreement. This was the case in 1980 when Greece wanted to return back to 
NATO, again in 1987 over an oil dispute and repeatedly through the 1970s and 1980s as 
a way to ensure that NATO would prevent Turkey from attacking181. Attitudes built up 
during the reign of the junta would cause problems, both militarily and politically, well 
into the next decade. As said by John Zighdis during his congressional appearance, “it is 
within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance that Greek territory was transformed into a 
vast concentration camp for its people”182, and this was precisely what led to the anti-
Americanism after the junta was gone. He went on to say that this massive wave of anti-
Americanism was developing due to the perception that American activity both support 
the regime and kept it in power183. By choosing to support a regime in order to protect 
short-term military goals, the United States, through a series of policy adjustments, forgot 
the main purpose of its initial entrance into the country. In doing so, the United States 
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fostered resentment in the young officer corps of Greece and the population it had 
originally tried to help. Moreover, it damaged the cornerstone of trust and confidence that 
had existed in the past. The United States would spend the next 30 years overcoming this 
decision and in some ways is still dealing with its outcome.  
In the next chapter we will see that, unlike the situation that existed in Greece, 
Spain was not making and strides towards democratization when the US began basing.  
The situation was actually completely the opposite. The country’s leader Franco, one of 
the world’s last remaining dictators, made no conciliatory promises of democratic 
legislation.  His attitude towards the entire basing process was completely different than 
that of Greece. Very similar to US actions in Greece, however, was the measures the US 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
47 
IV.  COOPERATION WITH FRANCO AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
LONG-TERM US-SPANISH RELATIONS 
Spain’s entrance into the worldwide basing network of the United States and 
NATO was much different from that of Greece. When the United States began dealing 
with Greece, the country was already making moves toward democracy and was open to 
making their own level of democracy part of the basing plan.  Spain on the other hand, 
was an international pariah in the post World War II years and was far from being 
considered an equal partner with any NATO members. As the Cold War intensified, 
Spain moved from being an international outcast to a country courted by the United 
States, because its location (within striking distance of the Soviet Union and the 
Mediterranean) made it vital to America’s plan for the defense of Europe. Acting against 
the recommendations of its NATO partners the United States entered into a basing 
agreement that offered unlimited access to Spain in terms of basing, while in an effort to 
avoid criticism from allies, not promising, or guaranteeing for the mutual defense of 
Spain should they enter into a war184.  Just as in the chapter on Greece, the questions that 
need to be answered are: Why did the United States forgo prior political regional 
objectives for near-goals in regards to basing in Spain, and how did this effects the long-
term basing and political relationship between the two countries? 
Lacking a mutual defense clause, the pact’s designers hoped that it would not be 
taken as proof that the United States was interested in supporting Franco and his 
authoritarian regime. As the United States would discover, attempting to have strategic 
relations without providing official political support was a dangerous tightrope to walk. 
Relations with the United States clearly boosted Franco’s legitimacy within Spain.  As 
we shall see, the fact that the US government sent a delegation to Madrid in September of 
1948 to discuss future military relations185, actually provided him with a great political 
success before official basing and the economic the aid associated with it even began186. 
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As the Cold War’s intensity grew, and Spain’s strategic location continued to become 
important, the United States, to continue their strategic goals, succumbed to Franco’s 
insistence that the United States provide funds far greater than what had been initially 
offered187. From the relationship’s inception, it is clear the a form of mutual dependence 
would develop between the two partners—a dependence that, similar to what happened in 
Greece, would ultimately sour political relations between the two countries.  
Franco, aware that US recognition would assist in his own political viability as 
well as Spain’s recovery, took great advantage of US openness188 and used US presence 
to further his own causes. The United States on the other hand, risked entering into a 
basing plan that was reliant on a questionable dictator to secure strategic basing locations, 
and in doing so, placed the relationship itself in jeopardy by supporting a leader who 
represented the opposite of the democratic values it normally fought to defend. In the 
end, both parties in the pact needed each other and were willing to risk political fallout to 
reach their goals. For Franco, this was an easy bargain. For the United States, on the other 
hand, the price of admission it has had to pay continues to rise, as the anti-American 
views that developed during this period continue to affect Spain’s political viewpoints 
and elections even today. Of vital importance to the story, is that the seeds of mutual 
dependence that drove the parties together were set in as US basing began. For the United 
States, not seeing that the economic aid associated with the plan would work to prop up 
the Franco regime was to have long-lasting results.  
A. ECONOMIC FACTORS IN SPAIN BREED DEPENDENCY 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the last century was a time of amazingly 
positive growth for much of the Western world. Beginning in 1913, Spain experienced its 
best phase of accelerated per-capita growth and structural change. Experiencing a 
noticeable boost in its own macroeconomic performance, the country came closest to 
reaching the levels of France and the United Kingdom, as far as GDP, prior to 1930189. 
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The 1930s brought global depression, of which Spain was not exempt190, but Spain was 
forced to deal with in a far different way than her European counterparts. As we shall see, 
the depression induced civil war in Spain, forced it to deal with much of its economic 
problems in a bubble, and, in an ironic twist, resulted in seclusion that eventually made 
US basing so attractive to Franco. What is important to note is that in the pre-Franco 
years, Spain was a partner with the rest of the world during the period of massive growth 
prior to the great depression191. It was not until after 1939 and the Franco years that 
internal growth was hindered by economic protectionism and it own somewhat self-
induced seclusion. 
Additionally, much of what was happening in the United States before World War 
II had a very negative effect on Spain, and just like the rest of Europe, they were tied 
economically to the fortunes of the United States. Interestingly, in many ways, the anti-
capitalist views that stemmed from the global breakdown of the Great Depression, would 
later allow many to see Franco, and authoritarianism, as a viable option to other forms of 
government. The 20th century, which began as a period of solid growth for the Spanish 
economy, turned into a spiral of discontent in the 1930s, as global recession dropped per 
person GDP to 1910 levels192. Clearly, the depression had a disastrous effect on Spain 
and its economy, but it was nothing close to the disaster that was to come about through 
the Spanish Civil War.  
The self-induced carnage brought to Spain during the Spanish Civil War served as 
a precursor to the worldwide devastation that would result from World War II. All of 
what was not destroyed or lost during the great depression was destroyed in the battle that 
ensued193. The majority of the Spain’s infrastructures, including roads, bridges, and train 
tracks were all destroyed. Additionally, all of their existing financial mechanisms were 
gone. Destruction and loss of life were so complete that Franco, while siding with Hitler 
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during the war, refrained from actively participating in World War II besides sending just 
over a Brigade’s worth of fighters. The effects experienced by Spain in its post-civil war 
years, in terms of the overall welfare of the population, were clearly the worst it 
experienced during the last century194 and were greatly exacerbated by the fact that since 
the rest of the world was involved in World War II, Spain had to handle much of it on its 
own. How Franco was able to make a series of political moves and actually drive the 
United States and Germany to compete for his allegiance during the war was an amazing 
act, but also what later led to him to being ignored by Europe. Additionally, by balancing 
what little help he did receive from Germany, with the oil shipments and payments he 
received from the West, he was able to strengthen his hold on Spain, crush many of his 
competitors, and set himself up for a future alliance with the United States. However, as 
we shall see, it was precisely this double dealing in terms of how he chose to deal with 
his own economic situation, that led to many of his political problems, both inside and 
outside of Spain.  
Franco’s association with Hitler and his standing as being one of the only 
dictators to remain in power after World War II led to his becoming the true pariah of 
Europe in the eyes of other recovering countries. As previously mentioned, in the initial 
post-Civil War years, Franco received almost no outside aid other than the oil that the 
United States was sending as a token to keep him from siding completely with the Nazis. 
From all of his speeches and actions during early World War II, it is evident that Franco 
truly believed that the Germans would be victorious and that it was on their side that he 
would hedge most of his bets.  
The United States, in return for petroleum shipments, had requested that Franco 
remain neutral in the growing World War II conflict. In February 1944, in a complete 
surprise to Franco, the United States shut down petroleum shipments, stating that the 
ports and listening posts Franco had been offering to the Nazis, as well as the shipments 
of wolfram (material used in tungsten and other war materials) he had been making over 
the line, would have to stop195. Interestingly, it is commonly known that once the war 
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had begun, authoritarianism, as popular as it was in the Spain, was seen by the United 
States and United Kingdom as the center of what was becoming the driving force behind 
the evil empire and was looked at with any deal of respect. For this reason and others, 
Franco was regarded by Roosevelt as a “satellite Hitler,”196 and just after Franco’s 
victory in 1939, all US support, other than these token oil shipments, came to and end.  
By 1944, the tungsten and iron that were being shipped out of Spain to Germany 
were thought of as being key to Germany’s war effort, and the United States and other 
allies were concerned about their impact on Germany’s war fighting capability. Cutting 
the oil supplies to Spain, at an already difficult time for the Spanish economy, had a 
powerful effect on an already declining situation. Things became so bad that by April 
1944, when Franco had his victory parade in Madrid, there was no fuel for armored cars 
or tanks197. Wagons were again common, and Spain was being set back years by the 
embargo.  
What is interesting about this struggle with the West is the way Franco seemed to 
handle it with ease. He simply used it as a reason to continue his internal fight against 
communist insurgents and as a way to stay in power by arguing that the country should 
rally behind him and he would work to keep Spain out of the war, while the whole world 
was against them.  In the years after the war, Franco would use Spain’s outcast status in 
much the same way to strengthen his internal position while solidifying the support of the 
Spanish people behind him198. During the riff over oil, he had control of the press and 
was able to continually repeat this mantra. By the time of his oil embargo incident in the 
west, even though he continued to covertly back Germany, it was apparent that Hitler 
might have a hard time turning the tide on his eastern Russian front. Franco took 
advantage of the situation by offering a conciliatory gesture to the United States. He 
satisfied the accusations that he was helping the Germans and solidified his popularity at 
home by brining back his Spanish Legion and air squadron from the Russian front. In 
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return for this, he requested a return of oil shipments as well as arms199. Initially, not 
interested with the deal and involved in an election, the United States went against the 
United Kingdom, which had already resumed shipments and denied any kind of bargain. 
The public in America was clearly, at least for the time being, against further support of 
Franco.  
Finally, on May 2, 1944, when it looked like the Germans were going to supply 
petroleum, wheat, and machinery to Spain, the United States decided to resume oil 
shipments. This done not only because Franco was bringing back his troops from the 
Russian front, but because he had agreed to reduce his German wolfram shipments to 
almost nothing200. Other than the little oil and wheat from the West, which had begun 
flowing again after this agreement, Franco was treated with open contempt201. Despite 
these efforts and others by the allies, Franco publicly continued to support Germany 
throughout the war. It was this fact, more so than his dictatorship, that solidified his 
outsider status and hostile treatment by the West once the war was over202. His control of 
all forms of media inside of Spain allowed him to perpetuate his view that dictatorships 
were the best form of government. He did this by continuing to broadcast positive stories, 
making it appear as the though the war would eventually turn back in favor of Germany. 
It was as though he wanted Spain to believe that the Germans were falling back in 
an effort to lure the ally’s in for a big final massacre. He successfully sent this message 
out through all radio broadcasts and continued the propaganda unceasingly203. 
Additionally, Franco allowed German radio listening posts and radar stations to operate 
in Spain until the end of the war204. This hardcore support of the German regime came to 
an end when Franco finally realized that Germany was not going to win the war and 
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began to openly talk about siding with the Allies to work together to defeat communism, 
Spanish relations in terms of US basing were on the way.  
Strategically, using his anti-communist stance as a foot in the door, Franco early 
on began positioning himself as the West’s only option in the global fight against a 
spreading Soviet influence. In October of 1944, he wrote a letter to Churchill that 
proposed the beginning of a Spanish-British anti-Bolshevik coalition205. Thus, before the 
war had ended, Franco, for reasons that were both economic as well as political, began 
reaching out to the West to maintain his viability and power. He was aware that there 
were strong communist guerrilla forces still operating in the North and East of his 
country and that an alliance to fight communism would allow him to continue his grip on 
his own country while opening up important alliances with others206. In the end, what 
really got the United Kingdom and the United States to look at Franco as a serious 
partner was the fact that many knew that if help was not sent, Franco would either 
succumb to, or turn to, communism. Just as the Junta had been allowed to stay in power 
for their important location and anti-communist sentiment, Franco got his first official 
recognition from the West because of the help he could provide in the emerging cold 
war—this, in 1944, before the founding of NATO and true riffs between the West and 
Russia had arisen. Churchill declared in November 1944, “Should the communist become 
masters of Spain, we must expect the infection to spread very fast through Italy and 
France”207. As the Second World War was drawing to an end, it was apparent that 
Franco, as well as Spain’s strategic location, were going to play a vital roll in the 
developing Cold War and the struggle that was to come between capitalism and 
communism.  
B. YEARS OF EXILE TURN TO COOPERATION  
Franco’s double dealings with both sides and his standing as one of the last the 
dictators to remain in Western Europe proved detrimental to Spain. Franco was offered 
no part of the Marshall Plan aid, this, despite his best efforts to open a dialogue with the 
                                                 
205 Ibid. p. 517  
206 Department of the Army, Spain, A Country Study. Washington DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1990 p.46 
207 Preston, Paul. Franco, A Biography. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher Inc., 1994. p.  521.  
54 
British and Americans before the war came to an end. One cause in the difference in 
recovery levels between Spain and other European countries obviously was the presence 
of Franco. Immediately after the war, London and Washington made it clear that they 
really would like to see Franco gone, but, in reasoning similar to decisions made in 
regards to Saddam after the first gulf war, were not ready to attempt to dislodge him for 
fear it would spark another civil war in an already unstable region208.  
After the end of the Civil War, Franco answered calls from Western powers to 
resign and hand over power by saying “No.” He found himself without foreign trade or 
diplomatic ties209 and in the middle of his darkest moment210. When looking at the rapid 
development of other destroyed countries, most notably France, it is obvious that 
Franco’s banishment from Western alliances and his not receiving Marshall Plan aid 
played a major factor in the slow development of Spain between the end of World War II 
and the mid 1950s. The biggest gap between France and Spain with regard to per person 
GDP was during 1939-50211. The 1950s in particular, while being a time of great growth 
and recovery for the rest of Europe, are only associated with poor performance in 
Spain212.  
Spain’s poor economic performance after the war seems to imply that problems 
were caused by more than a lack of Marshall Fund aid. It shows the negative effects that 
the protectionist autocratic government had on the country. Similar to the end of the war 
in Iraq in the early 90s when allies of the United States assumed that the major defeat 
suffered by the Iraqis would lead to the implosion of their leading regime and the 
downfall of Saddam Hussein, many Western allies did not see the long-term viability of 
the Franco Regime. It is clear that an additional reason for Spain’s poor performance was 
simply that many Western states did not see Franco’s long-term staying power213; 
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instead, they hoped for his failure. It is debatable whether or not outside countries would 
have participated had they realized Franco might be there for an extended period of time. 
It is clear that outside support, or even trade, would have helped Spain develop quicker214 
compared to their go-it-alone ways. Instead, it remained exactly what other countries saw 
it to be, a backward and non-industrialized, non-competitor. 
While his country was failing economically, he continued to use his international 
exile status, and the idea of international aggression that was building against him, to 
build support for his Francoist regime, increase pressure in his ongoing counter guerilla 
battle, shut down his frontiers and cut off relations with other countries. Bottom line is 
that he used the perceived siege and his exile status to justify not only the bad economic 
times in Spain but to increase his efforts to rid the country of any competitors, communist 
guerillas, and monarchist alike215.  
The international community supplied Franco with ample reasons to see himself 
as one man going against the entire world. In November 1946, the UN Security Council 
openly stated that the answer to the “Spanish Question” (as the issue of how to deal with 
Franco was spoken of in the UN) was to have Franco cede power to a representative and 
elected government. If this did not happen, or until it did, all of the countries involved 
pledged to break ties with him economically and pull all of their ambassadors out of 
Spain216. After this happened, one way that Franco continued to keep channels open with 
the United States and Britain during his time of international isolation was through his 
continuing battle against communism. While continuing to rid his own region of 
communist aggressors, he continued to speak outwardly that his regime in Spain served 
the United States better than any communist option. In the end, this idea proved true, as 
Cold War actions of the Soviet Union heightened the importance of basing in Spain. 
From the 1946 resolution onward, Franco continued to push the idea that Spain was the 
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heart of anti-communist operations. Despite this, he continued to be out of favor 
internationally217  
C. FRANCOISM 
Inside the country, this go-it-alone mentality, in regard to their own economy, led 
the autocratic regime to look for internal ways to fix their problems and built a fascist 
government focused on protectionist ideas and policies. Behind the beliefs and ideas of 
this new government was a complex political order that worked to change the 
demography, industry, agriculture, cities, and social classes of the country218. The goal of 
Franco’s government was to embody the supreme rule of one leader. The smaller 
governmental entities were given very little power. They were merely institutions created 
to implement different forms of political repression. His regime was considered to be far 
more fascist than anything else that existed219. The regime’s initial actions made the 
downfall of their economy even worse. Everything that other counties were trying to 
implement in regards to free trade and international participation, the totalitarian leader of 
Spain was busy fighting. All trade unions were banned, and a massive complicated 
bureaucracy known as the “vertical syndicate’ was established in its place220.  
Actions taken were meant to raise state government power while limiting any 
power from falling into the hands of competitors. These actions had an interesting effect 
on the economy and future development of the country. Selected groups that were given 
special protection (certain employer’s associations, Catholic organizations, some colleges 
that agreed with the government) became stronger because they no longer had to worry 
about competition. This had the effect of allowing the select groups to grab resources and 
gain influence and privilege but did not in any way help the country221. Instead of 
helping the country overall, Franco made it easier for select individuals to prosper and for 
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the ruling groups to become more powerful, while the bulk of Spain remained in a dismal 
economic state.  
Trade unions were not the only way his authoritarian regime tried to control 
economic activity. The regime also made an effort to control the exchange rate with an 
official fixed rate within certain pre-defined inflation levels. The end state of this effort, 
or experiment, was that the government became very strained trying to maintain a 
constant value, and the currency exchange rate was actually lowered in regard to other 
countries. Along with the currency, commodities prices were also regulated222. Strong 
government intervention and regulation were felt in all aspects of the economy. Each step 
of economic activity, from a new licensing system to the oversight of larger industries, 
was regulated and controlled223. All of these actions had the effect of lowering overall 
investment and savings, which in turn slowed overall economic growth. Without outside 
help, it was clear that the regime, as it was designed, would not have lasted long.  
D. COOLING OF TENSIONS 
What finally changed the UN’s ruling of 1946 were the many actions taken by the 
Soviet Union and the growing fear of communist bloc countries. Actions such as the 
communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February of 1948 and the Berlin blockade from 
June 24, 1948, to May 1949, all worked to focus allied attention on the development of a 
solid and integrated defense of Europe. Additionally, statements made by the United 
States during this time slowly began moving in Franco’s direction. Theodore C. Achilles, 
the Chief of the State Department’s western European Affairs division, outlined US 
policy toward Franco by stating that efforts to remove him had only served to strengthen 
his resistance and increase support for him in Spain224. Contrary to Franco’s many 
negative, anti-democratic moves, actions taken by the Soviet Union were making Franco 
more presentable to the United States as threats to the developing NATO alliance grew.  
In 1948, the US Defense department began looking toward Spain as a viable piece 
of the growing NATO defense structure and sent its first military mission to the country 
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to discuss possible basing agreements225. During these early meetings, representatives 
from the United States expressed interest in having the right to use several military bases 
to build strong naval and air forces in the region226. Franco also was given the 
opportunity to make it clear that in return for basing rights on his soil, he wanted solid US 
economic support for his economy227. During the meetings, Franco appeared willing to 
pay any price for an agreement with the United States that would solidify and legitimize 
his regime internationally228. Fortunately for Franco, Spain’s incredible geographic 
location, next to some of the world’s major land, air, and marine communications, made 
it an extremely potential partner for the alliance229. Additionally, the Iberian Peninsula, 
being 5000 km from the United States and only 2500 km from the heart of the Europe 
and part of USSR, offered a perfect option for the short-range bombers of the United 
States230.  
The key to the later basing agreement would actually come to be the medium-
range B-47 bombers of the United States. The backbone of the US Air Force throughout 
the 1950s, they were to be accompanied by fighters and several spread out but 
interconnected, ground surveillance posts231. Most western trading partners and even 
members of NATO completely disagreed with US plans for entering into an agreement 
with Franco. The British, led by their Parliamentary Under-Secretary Ernest Davies said 
that because Spain’s country and government were opposed to the democratic way of life, 
entering into an agreement with them would run counter to the goals of NATO. 
Additionally, he stated that because Franco opposed the Atlantic Charter’s preamble goal 
of safeguarding freedom, heritage, and rule of law, any organizational dealing with him 
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would be a complete embarrassment232. In addition to British disagreement, the French 
government actually made a formal protest against US talks with Spain233. The only 
dealing with Franco, according to the British would have to be outside of NATO in the 
form of a Spanish-US bilateral agreement234.  
While the United States worked to bring other allies into the plan to open basing 
and economic dealings with Spain, Soviet action would again play into the hands of 
Franco. In September 1949, Truman announced that the Soviets had detonated their first 
atomic bomb. Pressure was intensified to solidify a basing agreement with Spain, and 
later in 1949, in an effort to increase US presence in the Mediterranean, for the first time, 
a squadron from the US Eastern Atlantic Fleet anchored at the El Ferrol harbor and 
stayed for 5 days235. US basing in Spain and a bilateral agreement was on the way.  
Tragic among the international developments that took place toward the end of 
Spain’s isolation was the fact that Franco was able to take all of his negotiations with the 
United States and use them to strengthen his already authoritarian regime. Visitors from 
the United States helped legitimize his regime.  They were used to show that he had been 
just in his ruling of the country, and that there was no need to make changes to his 
political system. Furthermore, even after such domestically and economically troubling 
times in his own country, association with the US allowed him to boast that it was in fact 
the United States who came to him and he could claim no need to have made 
concessions236. It was during time of the initial talks that Franco also began to arrest 
several prominent monarchists in secret night swoops conducted by the official police 
force. Anyone suspect of conspiracy to restore democracy was subject to detention.  US 
talks with Franco served to strengthen NATO’s defense but also to fortify him 
domestically and internationally237.  
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The final step in the cooling of tensions between Spain and the United States 
came in November 1949 in the State Department’s call to allow US ambassadors to 
return to Madrid238. It is obvious that actions by the communist bloc and cold war 
tensions of which the United States was rapidly becoming a large part, turned the tide on 
world policy toward Spain and opened up the door for true US association with the 
Franco regime and his government.  
E. US BASING ASSOCIATION WITH SPAIN  
The Cold War and the growth of NATO had a great deal to do with Spain’s 
successful economic revival. The affirmation of the defense agreements between Spain 
and the United States in 1953 began the end of Spain’s seclusion and opened it up to the 
rest of the world239. The Pact of Madrid, the original basing agreement, was signed in 
August of 1953 and was the end of Spanish isolation240.  
In line with the military meetings that were held in 1948 and 1949, the goal of the 
pact was to “strengthen the capabilities of the West for the maintenance of international 
peace and security” and was to cover the construction and use of military facilities as 
well as the amount and aid to Spain241. The US goals of entering into a basing pact with 
Franco were met in that the pact offered almost no limit to the amount of armament the 
United States could place on Spanish soil242. Additionally, the United States was allowed 
to develop, build, and use jointly with Spanish forces, certain naval facilities and military 
airfields in the country243.  
It is clear that the military basing eventually opened the country up to other 
countries, and added an influx of aid, but this was spread out over time. Nothing, 
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however, compared to the massive boost that would have been offered with the Marshall 
Plan. The aid associated with the basing agreement did not arrive or come until about 
1953244. When it did arrive, it was 1.1 billion spread out over a 10-year period. The 
Marshall Plan would have brought 676 million in a single year, this would have 
amounted to 20% of that year’s GDP for Spain245. Under the plan’s provisions, beginning 
in 1954, Spain would receive 226 million in economic aid, 141 of it was to be military 
and 85 million was for nonmilitary purposes246. The key point to be taken from the treaty 
is that unlike the Atlantic Treaty, the agreement was not a mutual defense pact in that the 
United States did say they would aid in terms of providing for the defense of Spain, but 
the commitment was not open-ended and would only be enacted under certain conditions. 
Foremost of these conditions was that any action could not conflict with pre-established 
obligations of the Atlantic Charter247. In other words, the United States did everything 
they could to make it appear that they were not willing to disagree with NATO or fully 
enter into a defensive agreement with a dictator. Regardless of US intentions to appear 
ambivalent toward the dictator (after 17 years of isolation), Spain’s reestablishment of 
relations with the United States began an era that was to have a profound impact on its 
political, economic, and social life248. Not only did US goals of having strategic locations 
in Spain open up trade with the United States, but it legitimized Franco as a ruler and 
slowly, over the next 20 years, encouraged others to deal with the regime.  
From 1953 to 1958 the United States poured close to 400 million into Spain to 
build major SAC bases at Zaragoza, Torrejon, and Moron de la Frontera249. Additionally, 
military aspects of the agreement contained many building projects that poured 
immediate funds into the country. Examples include a 500-mile pipeline from Rota to 
Zaragoza and numerous early-warning and radar sites along with naval and ammunition 
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facilities250. New US associated military instillations sprang up around the country. In 
total, US investments associated with basing amounted to around 405 million. 
Furthermore, during the period from 1959 to 1975, America poured roughly 7 billion in 
military assistance to Spain251. This massive figure was composed of 1.9 billion in 
economic aid for the country, 2.2 billion in training and equipment for the Spanish 
military, and approximately 3 billion for the maintenance and production of bases252. 
This massive figure amounted to more than Spain’s gold reserves during that period and 
clearly had a positive impact on its economy253.  
In return for accepting the US facilities, Spain was able to use its bilateral 
relations with the United States as the key to its foreign policy. Through US association, 
Franco was able to slowly move back into the western family of nations254. Were it not 
for its association with the United States, it is debatable whether or not Spain would have 
ever made a recovery under Franco. While the United States was more interested in 
strategic locations of basing, Franco, made sure to get all that he could out of the 
arrangement.  
Weary of NATO entanglements, he focused on getting as much as he could from 
the United States, and then used his alliance with them to parley into trade and 
partnerships with other nations. As directed by the US Congress, the original agreement 
only provided that the United States provide “support of Spanish defense efforts for 
agreed purposes and to provide military end-item assistance to Spain”255. Once the 
agreement was set, Franco was cleared to begin negotiations as a leader with US backing, 
and this affected the economy of Spain in more positive way than any aid from the 
United States. Additionally, the United States ultimately wanted Spain to be a part of 
NATO, thus giving others a chance to share in the cost. However, most European 
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countries did not consider this an option. Franco’s unpopularity continued throughout his 
rein, and most Western allied counties (except Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway) 
were extremely vocal about Franco not being allowed into alliance256. Once he was in, he 
was able to scrape together business deals, reform his banking sector and currency 
restrictions, and was able to solicit admission into international financial and economic 
organizations.  
The non-military aid tied to the deal was substantial. In 1953, the United States 
sent wheat, cotton, tobacco, oil, and other commodities worth over 1.2 billion to the 
country257. This action set a bad tone for the growing alliance because Franco was able to 
learn how important the strategic side of the basing agreement was to the United States. 
Due to this, it was really no surprise that 10 years after his original deal, he came back to 
the table and requested greater payments from the United States258. This was easy for 
him to do because by 1963 the facilities in Spain were a vital piece of the defense of 
Western Europe and the Mediterranean. Areas vital to the United States were the 
submarine base in Rota, which along with its sister base at Holy Lock, Scotland, served a 
primary role in US naval force. Additionally, the 16th Air Force in Torrejon had two 
support squadrons at Zaragoza and Moron. So in 1963, after requesting greater payments, 
it is easy to see why compensation to Spain and Franco almost doubled.  
While bases and the facilities associated with them supported Spain, world 
recognition was the portion of the basing agreement that benefited Spain the most. In an 
effort to broaden the burden sharing with regard to Spain, the United States pushed for 
greater amounts of global acknowledgment and for Spain’s admittance to important 
associations like the World Bank, the IMF, and the OEEC259. Being a part of these 
organizations had the effect of making Spain into the trading partner others wanted. The 
United States might have pushed for Spain’s admittance, but once involved, Spain needed 
to make serious changes to remain a member. Wishing to remain in the IMF and World 
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Bank required Franco to lift many restrictions on foreign investment. In July 1959, the 
Franco regime drew up a stabilization program that had been designed by the OEEC and 
the IMF260. These plans began the Spanish turnaround. Additionally, with every new 
investing partner, Franco gained a country that had a vested interesting in ensuring 
Spain’s safety261. Becoming a part of these organizations could therefore be considered 
his back door into NATO.  
Once a recognized ally of the United States and a member of the important global 
trading organizations, the Spanish economy began to improve. Along with the reforms 
made, recognition by other economically recovering countries brought about 
improvements in the mid to late 50s and an economic growth rate in the 60s of 7.6%, 
second only to Japan262. Relations with other countries were great for many reasons but 
primarily because they allowed Spain to push tourism as a major part of its economy. In 
1960, tourism amounted to 51% of the country’s visible exports; by 1970 this number 
had grown to 70%. With so many tourists coming every year, all visitor-related industries 
grew rapidly, industries that might not have ever existed were it not for the Spanish 
relations with the United States263. In the end, it was European support that turned out to 
be Spain’s biggest trading partner and by 1972, Europeans had purchased 2 billion from 
the country. Arguably, this blossoming partnership never would have happened had the 
United States not moved in and helped to erase the countries pariah status. US basing in 
Spain had a rapid positive effect on the country, but it was acceptance into the world 
organizations that US basing brought that ultimately had the biggest effect on Spain’s 
economy. However, in regard to assisting with Franco’s political viability to secure 
basing rights, a good deal of anti-Americanism was to develop.  
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F. CONCLUSION: ASSOCIATION WITH FRANCO BREEDS ANTI-
AMERICANISM  
Spain’s transition to democracy began 20 years after US basing began in the 
region and actually had nothing to do with US participation. Franco had named his 
successor to be Prince Juan Carlos years before his demise was imminent264. While many 
worried that Franco’s absence would create a vacuum or political void that might lead to 
social unrest265, others more correctly assumed that since the Spanish Civil War 
remained fresh in the minds of many, and since Franco’s repression had continued until 
his death, (with the last 5 political executions taking place in 1975, months before his 
death) the people of Spain would look forward to change and a peaceful transition to Juan 
Carlos266. This, even though many considered him to be tarnished, or compromised, 
because it was Franco, after all, who had delivered him to power267.  
What the population of Spain received was much better than a simple transition 
from Franco to Juan Carlos. On November 20, 1975, when Franco died, the full authority 
for leading the country was placed in the hands of the young king268. He very quickly 
named as his prime minister Arias Navarro, a hard-line supporter of the monarchy but 
also someone open to ideas. The two went on the fill their cabinet with many liberal 
thinkers who were open to redefining the government and from there the transition did 
not take long.  On January 29, 1976, Arias announced a program of political reform that 
created a two-house parliament with the lower house elected.  This allowed for political 
groups (as long as they were not subversive or totalitarian) and a change in the laws to 
allow freedom of assembly269. This was approved by the acting president, Cortes, who 
also agreed to set an election time for his own position later that year. Juan Carlos 
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became very popular270. In a short amount of time, there was a transition from monarchy 
to democracy, a change that twenty years of US support of Franco had not come 
anywhere close to accomplishing.  The fact that US presence in the country was looked at 
by many as a factor in Franco’s staying power was not lost on Spain’s inhabitants271.  
After Franco’s death, many in Spain felt that without US support, his regime would have 
only lasted 2 or 3 years and that the help he received from the US helped him greatly272.  
This fact clearly did not go unnoticed for the people of Spain as well as for its future 
elected officials. From the time of Spain’s initial democratically elected government, the 
US began to see the effects of having supported Franco as official relations between the 
countries began to fade as more and more constraints were created and placed on US 
basing abilities.   
What was happening was a natural result of Spain’s overall negative perception of 
the United States and having US troops on Spanish soil. While anti-Americanism had 
developed in different places throughout Europe for a variety of reasons, anti-
Americanism in Spain was very specific273. Much of it actually existed before the 
Spanish Civil War and World War II as a result of Spain losing all of its colonies and its 
world status as a superpower to the United States during the Spanish American War. This 
already provided for a negative outlook toward the United States that grew much worse 
during the time of Franco for several reasons. First, the segment of the population that did 
support Franco resented the United States for its democratic form of government274. 
Second, and more importantly, the many opposed to Franco perceived the United States 
as the primary benefactor of his ruthless regime and, contrary to the actual goals of the 
United States when they began basing in the region, a major obstacle to the 
democratization of Spain. Many in Spain always resented the presence of US troops on 
Spanish ground and many would always remember seeing a widely publicized photo of 
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president Dwight D. Eisenhower embracing Franco at the time of the first agreement’s 
signing275.  This act was always used to highlight American support of the authoritarian 
leader that so many in Spain grew to despise.  
The anti-American sentiment created by these years of support had many different 
effects on the relations between the two countries.  Beginning dramatically in the early 
1980s, anti-American sentiment contributed to the socialists coming to power as limiting 
US presence in Spain was used as a major portion of the platform. In 1982, after running 
for election on a platform that promised to reduce US military presence, Gonzalez leader 
of the Socialist party, was elected President of Spain276.  Interestingly, after Spain was 
finally admitted into NATO in early 1982, Gonzalez’s party steamed into office with 
anti-NATO rhetoric and promises of placing Spain’s in the alliance to a general 
election277.  He attacked Spain’s presence in NATO continually during the campaign and 
used this viewpoint, as well as the anti-Americanism associated with it, to drive much of 
his support.278 In 1986, when Gonzalez finally put membership in the alliance before the 
Spanish population as a general vote, many in the country were still greatly anti-NATO 
as well as anti-American.  At the time of the vote, anti-Americanism was at the heart of 
the argument and was very much linked to any association with NATO279.  Many 
Spaniards in the mid 1980s considered the United States more of a global threat to peace 
than the Soviet Union280.  They also saw the UN as something that the US controlled, 
and for both these reasons, were frightened about being involved.  All of these beliefs 
stemmed from US political association with Franco.  Not forgotten among the Spanish 
people was the fact that not a single world leader had visited Franco from Western 
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Europe, while presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford all did281.  When, in 1986, Spain 
began to push forth the idea of placing their membership in NATO before a general vote, 
people of many NATO countries became nervous.  Many feared that a vote out of NATO 
might encourage Greece to do the same282.  Luckily for NATO and its member states, a 
majority of the people of Spain chose the political and economic stability associated with 
NATO states over their existing anti-Americanism and voted to remain in NATO by a 
slim 52% of the majority283.   
Interesting in the vote were the concessions that were thrown in that helped it 
pass. It was not simply a “yes” or “no” vote to stay in NATO, but was a vote on whether 
or not to stay in NATO under certain conditions.  Most important of these conditions was 
a reduction of US troops on Spanish soil and the continued ability of Spain’s forces to 
operate outside of NATO’s integrated command284.  Shortly after the vote, anti-American 
sentiment was strong, as ten of thousands gathered to protest the arrival of President 
Reagan and the continued presence of US bases in Spain285.  After the country’s NATO 
vote, Gonzalez moved quickly to take action.  In 1987, the United States would have to 
have all of its seventy-two F-16 fighter bombers removed from Spain286. The news that 
the US was going to move its 72 warplanes from Spain was seen by most of NATO as an 
attempt to work with Prime Minister Gonzalez who was focusing on appeasing the anti-
American left in his country287.  Before moving the planes, the United States was able to 
reach an agreement that called for a marked reduction of US presence in Spain and 
terminated US military and economic aid that had been tied to the defense treaty288.  
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More recently, anti-American views showed themselves again in the dramatic 
lack of support that Prime Minister Jose Aznar received inside of Spain when he decided 
to support the recent US-led invasion of Iraq. The overwhelming opposition of the 
Spanish population did not sway Aznar in his support of the war and his deployment of 
troops to the region289.  It did, however, play a significant role in his not being re-elected. 
While many in Spain have always been somewhat isolationist, not interested in 
meddling in foreign wars, the US-led invasion of Iraq was unpopular for reasons that 
went beyond the country’s normal isolationist tendencies290. Foremost of these reasons 
was the fact that Aznar moved away from his European neighbors by his actions 
supporting the US-led invasion, and this created the worst perception possible. The 
Spanish population as a whole, still weary of the US dealings with Franco, was not 
interested in taking part in US-led operations and this is one reason why Luis Zapatero, 
the newly elected president of Spain, was able to upset the sitting, and economically 
successful, Jose Aznar291.  What Aznar found out was that while there are many differing 
political factions existing in Spain, the one thing that continues to connect all of the 
ideologies together is an unconditional devotion to anti-Americanism292. 
Currently, the United States enjoys access to the naval base at Rota and the 
airfield of Moron. While no large troop deployments are permanently stationed in either 
location, they both have played an important part in recent worldwide troop deployments 
and flights with regard to the war on terror. Politically, however, Spain is still recovering 
from the shadow of Franco’s authoritarian rule and any US presence at all is an 
unfortunate reminder of that fact. Spain will continue to remain and important partner in 
the NATO alliance, but, as most of the Spanish population continues to associate the 
United States with Franco, the country will most likely only continue to be an indifferent 
supporter of US military actions around the world.  
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V. SIGNIFICANCE OF KYRGYZSTAN TO US TROOP 
REPOSITIONING: WHY THE MISTAKES LEARNED 
THROUGH BASING IN GREECE AND SPAIN MUST NOT BE 
REPEATED 
As demonstrated in the preceding two chapters, US collaboration with the 
authoritarian regimes of both Greece and Spain eventually contributed greatly to 
complications in America’s basing plans for both countries. Additionally, the people of 
these countries saw continued US commitment as approval for the very dictatorial 
governments that they were struggling to live under and were growing to disdain. Today, 
the United States continues to regain some of the respect lost during these periods in 
these 2 countries.  
Just as the growing Cold War (and American participation in it) lead to US 
military alliances with these questionable regimes, another global conflict and emerging 
troop positioning plan is once again helping to define global posturing for a generation of 
US leaders. In the cases of Greece and Spain, their strategic location and potential role in 
the battle against the growing Soviet threat, as well as the possibilities of political unrest 
and civil strife, led to their being considered attractive locations for US basing. Today, a 
regional hot spot is once again attracting the United States’ attention as a potential locale 
for basing. This time, it is not the Cold War and any particular country’s position with  
regard to Soviet area of operations that is important to US global positioning. Instead, it 
is the war on terror and the global “Arch of Instability.”293 This time, it is not the 
Mediterranean that is of interest (as was the case with Greece and Spain), it is the Middle 
East. It is the Kyrgyz Republic, a country struggling to escape its recent communist past, 
that is arising as one of America’s primary allies close to this area of interest. This 
chapter will take into account the lessons learned from US participation with the Junta 
and Franco to uncover whether or not mistakes are again being made that could 
negatively affect our long-term goals in the Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia.  
                                                 
293 Garamone, Jim. “Rumsfeld, Myers Discuss Military Global Posture" American Forces Information 
Service News Articles (24 SEP 04) 
72 
Similar to Greece and Spain, there are many reasons why this area is attractive. 
Also similar is the fact that along with a growing US presence, government crackdowns 
and other authoritarian actions appear to be on the rise. While there are many similarities 
between what made Greece and Spain attractive for basing and what is now drawing the 
United States to Kyrgyzstan, what needs to be avoided now are the negative 
consequences of dealing with, and appearing to support, authoritarian regimes. If the 
United States is not concerned with this, the populations of Central Asia, as we learned 
with Greece and Spain, surely will be.  
Three years ago, no American could have predicted being stationed in remote 
regions of Kyrgyzstan, but after 9/11 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan many things 
are different. As previously mentioned, drastic changes began in the late 90s, when the 
United States found itself burdened with a troop deployment plan that was based more on 
wars from decades past than on any predicted threat from the future. In addition, with 
national defense spending down from its earlier record levels but still higher than any 
other nation in world, many in the United States were beginning to question whether or 
not the practice of keeping large numbers of troops in Germany (which had existed since 
World War II) was still practical. Surprisingly, administrations for decades had sought 
ways to lower the number of troops required inside of Europe while encouraging others 
to pick up a share of the burden. It was not until the fall of the Soviet Union that the 
United States could finally reexamine its troop stationing plan and decide how well it 
matched its armed forces strategy. Recent events, including the attacks of 9/11, have 
enabled the current administration to begin a massive change in its overall troop 
deployment plan.  
According to General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, all 
Air Force and Army facilities in Germany, with the exception of the Air Force base at 
Ramstein, might close. The news, which surprised some US allies, could affect over 
25,000 troops294 that might soon fine themselves stationed in some of the more-remote 
regions of the world such as Central Asia or Eastern Europe. America’s new troop basing 
plan will focus on spreading out the military’s overall footprint in an effort to increase 
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readiness and facilitate quicker response times to emergencies295. This chapter will 
discuss the background of the plan as it relates to Kyrgyzstan and discuss the strategic 
interest that the region holds to the United States. It will also look at the questionable 
authoritarian practices taking place that, after learning from US basing strategies in 
Greece and Spain, the United States should want to avoid.  
Because of its location, Kyrgyzstan is beginning to play an important role in 
geopolitical politics. After September 11, 2001, Kyrgyzstan opened its doors to support 
NATO’s battle against the Taliban. The terms of the invitation were both open and 
unquestioning. However, as more and more countries rush to claim ground in the area, 
and the government of Kyrgyzstan grows in internal strength from the support they are 
receiving from so many large allies, the doors might not remain open for much longer on 
such friendly terms. 
A. AMERICA’S NEW TROOP DEPLOYMENT PLAN    
What is being considered the largest change in America’s troop deployment plan 
since World War II had its beginnings in the early 90s at the end of the Cold War. In 
1990, President Bush was beginning a re-alignment of stationing in conjunction with a 
major cutback of the total world force. The US Army cut more than 500,000 troops 
overall and lowered the number of troops in Germany by 125,000. In all, 275 sites were 
closed in the United States and around the world296. Strangely, the reduction of troops in 
Europe and the United States did not come with any radical change in the way US 
soldiers were trained and deployed around the Globe.  The numbers were smaller but the 
overall deployment plan remained the same.  
Prior to the attacks of 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had already 
given the order to begin a total reevaluation of our troop posture in Korea and 
Germany297. After 9/11, a new impetus was given to the re-shuffle and to how the United 
States could conduct its growing role in the war on terror. The new deployment plan 
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called for (among other things) troop transitioning away from the large Cold War style 
garrisons to smaller locations around the globe that will facilitate short-term combat-
ready deployments. Families would not accompany troops on deployments, and this 
would alleviate the need for the big ‘mall of America’ style of post the that the United 
States grew used to in Germany298. This is known as forward-basing strategy and is less 
focused on long-term troop deployments and more focused on extending military 
capabilities around the globe. The goal is flexible, rapid, and efficient projection of 
strength into regions of the world from which threats seem to be emanating299. The 
underlying result is a slow move of America’s troop posture from Western Europe to the 
Middle East and other areas300.  
Many of the areas being considered would have troops rotating through on a full-
time bases, these locations might include places like Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Bulgaria. Other locations could serve as smaller, minimally staffed, jump-off points 
closer to possible hot spots and areas like the Middle East. Kyrgyzstan, for a variety of 
reasons both strategic and economic, might serve as one of these locations301 to expand 
the military’s reach into troubled spots302. The military is even considering more rigorous 
locations such as Azerbaijan, Kenya, and other places around the Horn of Africa. 
Following the guidelines of the plan and the impetus of 9/11, the United States has 
expanded or created military facilities in Diego Garcia, the Philippines, Djibouti, 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Romania, Bulgaria, Oman, 
Kuwait, and Qatar303. More change is on the way.  
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This collection of trouble spots runs through the Caribbean Rim, Africa, the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Korea304 is becoming known as the 
‘arc of instability’ and is playing in major role in how the United States contracts and 
deals its next series of troop locations in places like Kyrgyzstan. As said by Colin Powell, 
“We want to put in place facilities that give us access to training areas in different 
countries or facilitate the movement of our forces through Europe to other parts of the 
world as we change the strategy of NATO not to deal with the Soviet Union, but to deal 
with terrorism, to deal with regional crises in other parts of the world”305. For a variety of 
reasons, as the plan nears fruition and while the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq 
continue without a clear end in site, Kyrgyzstan’s importance in the overall plan grows 
with each passing day. As said by US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Air Force General 
Richard B. Myers, “This plan is in the best interest of national security and of our troops, 
it will leave us better positioned to engage our allies and promote regional stability. It 
will allow us to promote regional stability while position us better to prevail in combat 
when war cannot be prevented.”306 
B. US STRATEGIC INTEREST IN KYRGYZSTAN 
The attacks on the twin towers on 9/11 encouraged Western powers to look at 
Central Asia in a new way. America, after discontinuing its support of Afghanistan over a 
decade before, now looked at the political regime controlling the country, the Taliban, as 
an enemy. Several Central Asia countries offered help by allowing basing rights and fly 
over privileges. Kyrgyzstan was one of the first to open its door. The country’s southern 
neighbor, Uzbekistan, also agreed to allow basing, while Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
agreed to allow only fly overs307. This open door policy was seen by some as a way for 
Kyrgyzstan to become less dependent on Russia by seeking to become closer to the West. 
For economic and strategic reasons the West, including the United States, was eager for a 
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mutually beneficial relationship with the country located in the southern rim of Russia308. 
In her October 2003 testimony to congress, Assistant Secretary for European and 
Eurasian Affairs, Elizabeth Jones, stated that the three primary sets of security interests 
that the United States has in Central Asia are encompassed under the headings of energy 
(maintain reliable access to global markets), security (initially anti-terror focused), and 
internal reform (mostly economic but also political)309.  
There are several clear economic reasons why the United States was eager for the 
relationship with Kyrgyzstan. First, most recent estimates place the amount of oil in 
Central Asia and the Caspian region at nearly 100 billion barrels (without any additional 
finds) worth 2.7 trillion dollars310. At its high point in 10 to 15 years, Central Asia could 
provide 3 to 4.5 percent of the world’s total output311. Clearly, the United States is 
interested in stability in this region. Kyrgyzstan is not one of the areas oil producers, but 
its help in the war on terror offers the United States a foothold in a region where stability 
and future democracy are of utmost importance. Stability is the second reason why the 
area is vital to the United States and its Western allies. The United States does not want 
Central Asia to turn into a hotbed for terrorism and discontent, and Kyrgyzstan, being one 
of the poorest countries in the region, is an important place to provide help. Without US 
presence in the region, it is feared that Iran and Russia would be able to establish energy 
exporting monopolies and have the ability to wrestle fuel away from NATO-allied 
countries. Strategically, blocking Iran’s influence and encouraging autonomy from 
Russian is one of the reasons why the area is important to the United States. Lastly, 
Kyrgyzstan’s location is strategically important in the War on Terror. Of all the reasons 
why the US military moved so fast into Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan, geography was 
most likely the most important312. Interestingly, most of the old bases that US troops fell 
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in on leading up to and during the war in Afghanistan were former Soviet bases that were 
used for the exact same reason313.  
America’s largest air base in Germany, Ramstein, is close to 3,000 miles away 
from Afghanistan, meaning that supply, as well as combat planes, have to refuel in route 
to their destination. For this reason, the United States has established a collection of 13 
bases in the region, the largest of the newer ones being Manas Air Force Base314 
(recently re-named Peter Ganci Airbase315 in honor of the New York city fire chief who 
died during the World Trade Center attacks316). With the current withdrawal of attack 
and support aircraft out of Turkey, Ganci airbase has become much more important and 
attractive317. All of these are very compelling reasons why the United States should 
project its presence in Kyrgyzstan, but it is the country’s potential to become a global hot 
spot and its proximity to the “Arc of Instability” that makes basing there particularly 
important.  
C. POTENTIAL “HOT SPOT” 
Kyrgyzstan, being the poorest state in the region, is on precarious grounds for a 
variety of reasons, and the United States, along with other allies, plans to prevent it from 
becoming a breeding ground for terrorism. Just as the initial aid that was sent into Greece 
after the United Kingdom realized that they could no longer support the counter 
communist groups of the region, aid is needed in Kyrgyzstan to ensure that it does not 
sink into a pit of destruction and despair that would create more terrorism in the region. 
Several key factors are making other counties concerned.  
First, crime and corruption are present and make up a large part of the overall 
economy. The black market is estimated to be the same size at the official financial 
system. This adds a significant amount of stress to an economy that is struggling to 
transform from a communist to a capitalist society. The large amount of debt Kyrgyzstan 
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owes to Russia has contributed to low amounts of investment from Western investors. 
This has also added to low standards of living and overall unrest318. A recent survey 
conducted by USAID found that close to 60% of the country, upset with a continuing 
drop in the standard of living, would like to return to some kind of communist rule. 
USAID also reports a sharp drop in the country’s internal expenditures on health and 
education from 10.5 percent of GDP in 1995 to only 6.2 percent in 1999319. Sadly, this is 
as much a cause of internal turmoil as it is a result of additional demands on an 
overburdened government. Secondly, while Kyrgyzstan does export a small amount of 
energy in the form of electrical power, it is predominantly an energy importer with most 
of its oil being imported from Russia. A total of 85% of its oil is imported, increasing its 
inability to gain complete autonomy from Russia. With all of these problems being 
experienced by Kyrgyzstan, slow growth is the best that can be hoped for through the 
next 10-15 years320. Clearly, there is much work for the United States in the region. It is 
an important country that would benefit from a strong, stable form of democracy. US 
commitment toward improving the economic and political situation in Kyrgyzstan could 
only prove positive. 
D. US AND NATO MILITARY ACTIVITY  
Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan offers the United States the best base it has access 
to in the region. An ex-Soviet bomber base, Manas has a runway capable of supporting 
the largest American bombers and is close enough to Afghanistan to provide excellent 
support for the war on terror. With the speed at which American troops deployed to the 
Afghan theatre, the condition and size of the runway is vital321. With its 13,800-foot long 
runway, Manas has provided support and staging areas for C5s, C17s, C141s, and French 
and Turkish refueling tankers, along with civilian 747s being used as troop transports322. 
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The base is positioned a mere three hours from Kandajar, less than 1,000 miles323. The 
initial contract carried with it a lump sum payment of 100 million dollars and will bring 
in around 60 million a year through US payments and estimated building contracts on the 
facilities324. Initially, the agreement was for a one-year period, later it was stretched to 
two years by a mutual accord of both governments, and in June of 2003, the United States 
made the situation more permanent by signing a three-year extension to the contract325. 
Monetary aid from the basing package is substantial. In 2003, the cash flow generated by 
the base was about $156,000 a day, coming to about 52 million for the year.  
Incredibly, this one base amounted to about 5% of Kyrgyzstan’s gross national 
product, second only to the nation’s gold mine with regard to its effect on the 
economy326. Troops on the ground will also make an impact. The size of the force 
serving there could grow to 3000. Currently over 300 locals are employed in the base327. 
By the end of 2003, US leaders recognized a long-term plan to sustain existing bases in 
the region328 and by August 2004, what had begun as a tent city had developed into many 
permanent or air conditioned tents, gyms, a small library, and an Internet café329. All 
signs point to a long stay. Currently, Air Force and contract engineers are busy carrying 
out a 60 million dollar year-long overhaul of the existing facility330. All of the work has 
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benefited the local population greatly. As said by an Air Force captain spokesman, “We 
are pouring a lot of new concrete”331.  
The US operation is larger than anything else in the region, and for many reasons 
it is important to the troop repositioning plan. First, when Kyrgyzstan opened its doors to 
allow the United States access to Manas Air base, it signed a contract that did not limit 
uses of the base. The base, which pumped 110 million dollars into the economy of the 
region during its first two years of existence, can be used for combat missions and troop 
deployments as well as for humanitarian missions. The strategic air hub executed more 
than 18,000 sorties in both Iraq and Afghanistan from its inception to August of 2004332. 
Other bases in the region only allow the humanitarian missions333. Its location, almost in 
between China and Russia, might offer another, often unmentioned, use for Manas. The 
base offers both the United States and Russia the opportunity to work together to limit 
China’s influence in the region334. As the United States works with Moscow to fight 
Islamic extremist, the base affords both countries the ability to limit Chinese influence in 
the region335. Similar to the US basing experience in Greece and Spain, NATO and US 
basing is also expected to have a dramatically positive effect on the willingness of 
investors, mostly Western, to devote money to the area336.  
With American military investment, the region also will see an increase in other 
types of aid. According to the most recent USAID pamphlet, “Assistance Strategy for 
Central Asia,” money into the region has increased, and Kyrgyzstan is receiving a large 
portion of the region’s overall aid337. The amount of money in the region has grown 
steadily after 1991. Kyrgyzstan’s 36.5 million dollar aid package for 2003 will be second 
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in total money received in the region and highest with regard to aid per capita, at almost 
$7 per person. Kazakhstan is a distant second with regard to per capita donations at just 
over $2338. While US money and military aid is pouring into the area, other countries 
have shown an interest in Kyrgyzstan, and like America, not all of their interest is purely 
military. As already mentioned, Russia has agreed to work with the United States in the 
War on Terror and is doing so on several fronts. In Central Asia, however, Russia is 
beginning to show signs that it does not want the United States to have complete 
autonomy and is strengthening its resolve. 
E. RUSSIAN INTEREST AND ACTIVITIES 
It is clear that Russia considers the five formerly communist states of Central Asia 
to be part of their area of influence. Interestingly, Putin initially agreed to US presence in 
the region. For reasons already mentioned, US entry was welcomed as part of the War on 
Terror, but the Russian people are beginning to show that they to have reasons to exert 
influence in Central Asia. First, like the United States, oil in the region is very important 
to Russia, and it wants to make sure benefits do not just go to the United States and its 
allies339. Secondly, Russia is not comfortable with any possible US plan for regime 
change in Iran and other things which it sees as meddling in the Middle East340. For these 
two reasons, it can’t completely turn the area over to the United States. Lastly, with 
regard to dealing with drug trafficking and Islamic extremism flowing out of 
Afghanistan, many feel that Russia would prefer to have autonomy and freedom to 
maneuver by owning the entire battle space. These conflicting goals of two major world 
powers have placed Kyrgyzstan in the middle of a chess game. 
 Russia, in an effort to maintain presence in the region recently opened its first 
base outside of Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. At the inaugural ceremonies for 
the new base, Putin said that the NATO base of Manas will be temporary and the new 
Russian facility, at Kant, will be open on a permanent basis341. He went on to say that the 
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base, which is just 20 miles down the road from the American base, will help to 
complement the US War on Terror in Afghanistan. Experts argue that this is more of a 
show of force on the part of Moscow, and that the planes used at the facility would not 
help to fight against terrorists in the region342. The Moscow claim, however, is that if the 
base would have been in place in the early 90s, many terrorist atrocities would have been 
prevented343. In addition to the base at Kant, Russia is planning to post its 201st 
Motorized Division at a new base outside Dushanbe, Tajikistan344. Based on these 
actions, it is apparent that Russia agrees with the United States that the region and 
Kyrgyzstan are of significant importance.  
F. INCREASED AUTHORITARIANISM IN KYRGYZSTAN 
Just as the United States, in an effort to fight communism in the Cold War, 
mistakenly relied heavily on sketchy authoritarian regimes in Greece and Spain, the 
United States must avoid doing the same thing in Central Asia. The added support felt by 
Kyrgyzstan’s government from the world’s only remaining superpower, as well as its 
large neighbor, the Soviet Union, is creating an environment in which it is easy to silence 
any political competitors.  
The challenge, as we learned in the Greece and Spain chapters, is clear.  
Authoritarian governments which receive assistance from the US gain legitimacy through 
the partnership and the US often finds itself on the losing side, politically, when the 
regime is gone.  This situation must be avoided in Central Asia.  As said by Elizabeth 
Wishnick of the Strategic Studies Institute, “Commitment to democratization in Iraq, 
while relying on authoritarian Muslim regimes elsewhere to persecute the war on 
terrorism, reveals inconsistencies in US policy”345. The goal of the United States is to 
avoid destroying its long-term relationship with the people of Central Asia by avoiding 
the same mistake it made during the Cold War. As the United States works to expand its 
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presence and support in the region, actions by the areas local governing regimes must be 
taken into account and made a part US overall decision whether to increase or call off 
support in terms of basing and political aid. If this is made clear from the beginning of the 
relationship, many problems can be avoided. If US support is looked at as a blank check 
to support any actions made by the government of Kyrgyzstan, just as it was in Greece 
and Spain, many problems will follow.  
Currently, the government of Kyrgyzstan, led by President Akayev, seems to be 
moving in a direction that seems opposite of true democracy, and many of the country’s 
worst actions began to take place prior to 9/11 and US intervention in the region. In 1993, 
after 50 years of Soviet rule, Kyrgyzstan signed into effect its first constitution346. While 
the initial constitution provided for term limits to the president and ample share of 
governing between the president, parliament, and the rest of government, Mr. Akayev, 
the first elected president, was quick to add changes to the document—changes that 
increased the power of the president and limited parliament’s role in governing. 
Additionally, in 1998, Mr. Akayev was able to circumvent the apparent rule that limited 
him to serving two terms by claiming that his first term was not completed totally under 
the new constitution347. This was upheld by the Constitutional Court and since then, his 
assault on the decision-making ability of parliament has only continued a manner so as to 
make the population question whether or not he is every going to fully turn over power to 
another elected president. Rumors and ideas abound in the country as to what the 
president plans to do for the next election. Many locals who opposed him are afraid that 
he is going to make name Nikolai Tanayev, currently serving as the president’s hand-
picked prime minister of Parliament, as his replacement348. In reality, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit has recently stated that it expects Mr. Akayev’s supporters to once again 
press for some kind of change to the constitution that would allow him to stay in office 
another term349. This, in spite of the fact that Akayev has repeatedly stated that he will 
step down after this term when elections take place in February 2005. It is quite likely 
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that after the fall of Georgian president, Shevardnadze, Akayev spoke opening in an 
effort to keep public sentiment down350.  
Actions such as those taken by Akayev over the last ten years or so is one reason 
why, on a recent ranking of the world’s most corrupt governments, Central Asian states 
and Kyrgyzstan ranked so high. Transparency International’s 2003 survey of the worst 
133 countries ranked Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as 100th (with 133 being the top) and 
Kyrgyzstan as 118th, second in Central Asia only to Tajikistan, which was 124th351. 
Various actions taken by the government in Kyrgyzstan are adding to questions of their 
own legitimacy. The authorities have also increased their hold on all broadcast media352, 
a very dangerous action in a country openly saying that it is making strides toward 
democratic freedom. Recently, both local networks, Pyramid TV and Osh TV, have been 
interrupted or shut off at times353. Additionally, Akayev’s efforts to fight Muslim 
fundamentalism have been used as a way to imprison many political competitors along 
with possible terrorists. The result is that almost no secular competitors to the 
government exist. Feliks Kulov, leader of the Ar-Namys party, one of Mr. Akayev’s 
biggest competitors, has been in prison on questionable corruption charges since the 2000 
presidential campaign354. Worse, as members of the Ar-Namys protest his imprisonment, 
they too are finding themselves being incarcerated. Another expected competitor for the 
2005 election, Almaz Atambayev, leader of the Social Democratic Party, recently found 
himself arrested and imprisoned for the murder of a high-ranking official355. Many are 
suggesting that this arrangement actually allowed Akayev to eliminate two possible 
competitors at once. While the West agrees with the aggressive fight against competitors, 
it does not wish to support crackdowns on innocent people. Worse yet, the government 
announced in May that it was conducting internal investigations on its own secret service 
for placing listening device in several different outside Non Government Organizations 
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including human rights organizations and the OSCE. The investigation that revealed the 
information was actually started by opposition forces in parliament356.  
These actions, being taken by the majority-ruled Akayev government, are adding 
to a weak economy and widespread poverty by scaring off legitimate investors and are 
creating a potentially dangerous situation, one in which outside assistance is almost vital 
to maintain strength and security in the region. Authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan is on the 
rise, and the United States is in a perfect position now to do something about it. The 
decisions made in the next several years with regard to how strictly the United States 
adheres to its stated security goals in the region, including democratization, will make all 
the difference in how the increase funds brought about through basing either positively or 
negatively affect the long-term relationship between the United States and Central Asia.  
G. CONCLUSION - HOW THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BASING IN 
CENTRAL ASIA  
In the region, China, Iran, India, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia all have 
committed actions, openly and subversively, which show some interest in the region. 
Interests are not all based on oil and most which do not fall in that category are on either 
preventing or fighting terrorist organizations and the poverty which usually helps to 
create it. Kyrgyzstan, being the poorest nations in the area, is of particular interest to 
China who wants to ensure that instability in the region does not spread to its mostly 
Islamic region of Xinjiang, and for this reason, China is committed to fighting terror in 
the region. China, in 1996, pushed for the formation of the Shanghai Five.  Still existent 
today, it currently strives to coordinate security matters and battle drugs throughout the 
region357. Iran, which established contacts to the region shortly after 1991, lacks the 
ability to exert much influence due to a lack of trust between Shiite Iran and mostly Sunni 
Central Asia. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan attempted to develop religious extremism in 
Central Asia during the 1990s, as they have in other parts of the world, but as of yet, they 
have not been overly successful358.  
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It is clear that Kyrgyzstan is important and America’s policy in the region 
exemplifies this fact. Whether or not allies are developed in the area or enemies created 
depends on how the next several years are handled by both the United States and NATO. 
In addition, after examining the influence of other countries, Kyrgyzstan’s importance to 
the new US troop repositioning plan is clear. Moscow’s continued focus on the region 
almost mirrors that of the United States, and, as NATO action in Afghanistan continues, 
Kyrgyzstan promises to become more militarily and economically interesting to both 
sides of the Atlantic.  
What is important for the United States is that it must commit to openly 
promoting and maintaining its plan of promoting democracy in the region. Unlike when 
the United States entered into basing agreements with both Greece and Spain, the United 
States does have certain human rights standards which must be met prior to the 
commitment of funds but they are not always upheld in the strictest fashion possible. The 
Nunn-Lugar Act requires the State Department to certify that a certain level of human 
rights exists in a country prior to the United States releasing nonproliferation funds. In 
January 2004, the State Department for the first time used this act to say no to a country 
receiving funds, in this case, Uzbekistan359. This did raise concerns about Uzbekistan’s 
human rights lapses, but it failed to stop the money completely. Interestingly, the Nunn-
Lugar Act has in it provisions for waiver in the case of national security considerations, 
and in this case, because the country does have uranium and relations are important, Bush 
has waved the violations360.  
After uncovering the lessons learned from the basing mistakes in Greece and 
Spain, it is clear that the United States must stick to its originally stated goals and avoid 
becoming involved in a situation where it is inseparably attached to an authoritarian 
government. Currently, it is not too late for the United States to reiterate its goals clearly 
and then stay the course. Central Asia, unlike the situations that occurred in Greece and 
Spain, does offer several options with regard to which country the United States can 
maintain solid relationships with. By striving to work with the country or countries most 
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committed to human rights improvements, the United States can advance democracy and 
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